On 8 May 2014, at 12:22, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 7 May 2014 16:45, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Thu, May 01, 2014 at 04:49:32PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >>> This is a repost of the arm64 crypto patches that I have posted to the LAKML >>> over the past months. They have now been verified on actual hardware >>> (Cortex-A57) so if there are no remaining issues I would like to propose them >>> for 3.16. >>> >>> Ard Biesheuvel (15): >>> asm-generic: allow generic unaligned access if the arch supports it >>> arm64: add abstractions for FPSIMD state manipulation >>> arm64: defer reloading a task's FPSIMD state to userland resume >>> arm64: add support for kernel mode NEON in interrupt context >>> arm64/crypto: SHA-1 using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions >>> arm64/crypto: SHA-224/SHA-256 using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions >>> arm64/crypto: GHASH secure hash using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions >>> arm64/crypto: AES using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions >>> arm64/crypto: AES in CCM mode using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions >>> arm64: pull in <asm/simd.h> from asm-generic >>> arm64/crypto: AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 NEON and Crypto >>> Extensions >>> arm64/crypto: add shared macro to test for NEED_RESCHED >>> arm64/crypto: add voluntary preemption to Crypto Extensions SHA1 >>> arm64/crypto: add voluntary preemption to Crypto Extensions SHA2 >>> arm64/crypto: add voluntary preemption to Crypto Extensions GHASH >> >> There are about 5 patches that make sense to me ;) and apart from a few >> minor comments they look fine. >> >> There are the other 10 crypto patches that are beyond my knowledge. Do >> you know anyone who could do a sanity check on them? Are there any tests >> that would show the correctness of the implementation? > > I will re-send the 3 FPSIMD patches separately with your review > comments addressed. Thanks. If you get another acked/reviewed-by tag on the rest of the patches it’s even better (I plan to get the series in for 3.16, after we do some tests internally as well). Catalin-- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
