"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue at us.ibm.com> writes: > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm at xmission.com): >> I actually have code that will let me fork a process in a new namespace today >> with out needing bind_ns. What is more I don't even have to be root >> to use it. > > Can you elaborate? The user namespace patches don't enforce ptrace > yet, so you could unshare as root, become uid 500, then as uid 500 > in the original namespace ptrace the process in the new namespace. > Is that what you're doing? If (when) ptrace enforces the uid namespace, > will that stop what you're doing? sys_ptrace is allowed in 2 situations. - The user and group identities are the same. - The calling process has CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability. So currently if the uid namespace enforces the user and group checks that will prevent the first case, and is very desirable. But it won't stop someone with CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Which given the normal case seems reasonable. Getting to the point where you can't trace what a process is doing would probably require some additional interprocess firewalling from something like selinux. Eric
