Linux API

• Date Index

• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, (continued)
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, H.J. Lu
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, H.J. Lu
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, H.J. Lu
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
            • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, H.J. Lu
              • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
                • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, H.J. Lu
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Hansen
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Florian Weimer
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Hansen
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Dave Martin
• [PATCH v3 00/14] IOASID extensions for guest SVA, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v3 02/14] iommu/ioasid: Rename ioasid_set_data(), Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v3 04/14] iommu/ioasid: Support setting system-wide capacity, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 04/14] iommu/ioasid: Support setting system-wide capacity, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 01/14] docs: Document IO Address Space ID (IOASID) APIs, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 01/14] docs: Document IO Address Space ID (IOASID) APIs, Jean-Philippe Brucker
      • Re: [PATCH v3 01/14] docs: Document IO Address Space ID (IOASID) APIs, Jacob Pan
        • Re: [PATCH v3 01/14] docs: Document IO Address Space ID (IOASID) APIs, Jean-Philippe Brucker
          • Re: [PATCH v3 01/14] docs: Document IO Address Space ID (IOASID) APIs, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v3 03/14] iommu/ioasid: Add a separate function for detach data, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 03/14] iommu/ioasid: Add a separate function for detach data, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 06/14] iommu/ioasid: Introduce API to adjust the quota of an ioasid_set, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 06/14] iommu/ioasid: Introduce API to adjust the quota of an ioasid_set, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 05/14] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and allocation APIs, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 05/14] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and allocation APIs, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 08/14] iommu/ioasid: Add reference couting functions, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 08/14] iommu/ioasid: Add reference couting functions, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 14/14] iommu/vt-d: Store guest PASID during bind, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v3 10/14] iommu/ioasid: Introduce notification APIs, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 10/14] iommu/ioasid: Introduce notification APIs, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 07/14] iommu/ioasid: Add an iterator API for ioasid_set, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 07/14] iommu/ioasid: Add an iterator API for ioasid_set, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 12/14] iommu/vt-d: Remove mm reference for guest SVA, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v3 13/14] iommu/vt-d: Listen to IOASID notifications, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v3 11/14] iommu/ioasid: Support mm type ioasid_set notifications, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 11/14] iommu/ioasid: Support mm type ioasid_set notifications, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • [PATCH v3 09/14] iommu/ioasid: Introduce ioasid_set private ID, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v3 09/14] iommu/ioasid: Introduce ioasid_set private ID, Jean-Philippe Brucker
  • Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] IOASID extensions for guest SVA, Jacob Pan
• [PATCH v11 0/6] ACPI: Support Generic Initiator proximity domains, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v11 1/6] ACPI: Support Generic Initiator only domains, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v11 2/6] x86: Support Generic Initiator only proximity domains, Jonathan Cameron
    • Re: [PATCH v11 2/6] x86: Support Generic Initiator only proximity domains, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v11 3/6] ACPI: Let ACPI know we support Generic Initiator Affinity Structures, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v11 4/6] ACPI: HMAT: Fix handling of changes from ACPI 6.2 to ACPI 6.3, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v11 5/6] node: Add access1 class to represent CPU to memory characteristics, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v11 6/6] docs: mm: numaperf.rst Add brief description for access class 1., Jonathan Cameron
    • Re: [PATCH v11 6/6] docs: mm: numaperf.rst Add brief description for access class 1., Randy Dunlap
• [RFC PATCH 1/2] rseq: Implement KTLS prototype for x86-64, Mathieu Desnoyers
  • [RFC PATCH 2/2] selftests/rseq: Adapt x86-64 rseq selftest to rseq KTLS prototype, Mathieu Desnoyers
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] rseq: Implement KTLS prototype for x86-64, Florian Weimer
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] rseq: Implement KTLS prototype for x86-64, Mathieu Desnoyers
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] rseq: Implement KTLS prototype for x86-64, Florian Weimer
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] rseq: Implement KTLS prototype for x86-64, Mathieu Desnoyers
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] rseq: Implement KTLS prototype for x86-64, Florian Weimer
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] rseq: Implement KTLS prototype for x86-64, Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH v13 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff(), Yu-cheng Yu
  • Re: [PATCH v13 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff(), Peter Collingbourne
    • Re: [PATCH v13 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff(), Yu, Yu-cheng
      • Re: [PATCH v13 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff(), Peter Collingbourne
        • Re: [PATCH v13 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff(), Yu, Yu-cheng
• [PATCH v13 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v12 0/6] IOMMU user API enhancement, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v12 3/6] iommu/uapi: Use named union for user data, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v12 4/6] iommu/uapi: Rename uapi functions, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v12 6/6] iommu/vt-d: Check UAPI data processed by IOMMU core, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v12 6/6] iommu/vt-d: Check UAPI data processed by IOMMU core, Auger Eric
  • [PATCH v12 1/6] docs: IOMMU user API, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v12 5/6] iommu/uapi: Handle data and argsz filled by users, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v12 5/6] iommu/uapi: Handle data and argsz filled by users, Auger Eric
  • [PATCH v12 2/6] iommu/uapi: Add argsz for user filled data, Jacob Pan
  • Re: [PATCH v12 0/6] IOMMU user API enhancement, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v12 0/6] IOMMU user API enhancement, Joerg Roedel
• [PATCH v13 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET), Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property(), Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack., Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 0/8] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v13 2/8] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v13 4/8] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v13 3/8] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v13 7/8] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Yu-cheng Yu
    • Re: [PATCH v13 7/8] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH v13 7/8] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Yu, Yu-cheng
  • [PATCH v13 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu-cheng Yu
    • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu, Yu-cheng
        • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
          • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu-cheng Yu
            • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
              • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu, Yu-cheng
              • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu, Yu-cheng
                • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
                  • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
                    • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu, Yu-cheng
                      • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
                        • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, H.J. Lu
                          • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
                            • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, H.J. Lu
                            • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu, Yu-cheng
                              • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Yu, Yu-cheng
                                • Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation, Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH v13 6/8] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v13 5/8] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v13 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCHv4 1/3] block: add zone specific block statuses, Keith Busch
  • Re: [PATCHv4 1/3] block: add zone specific block statuses, Keith Busch
  • Re: [PATCHv4 1/3] block: add zone specific block statuses, Keith Busch
    • Re: [PATCHv4 1/3] block: add zone specific block statuses, Keith Busch
      • Re: [PATCHv4 1/3] block: add zone specific block statuses, Jens Axboe
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCHv4 1/3] block: add zone specific block statuses, Keith Busch
• [PATCH v11 0/6] IOMMU user API enhancement, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v11 1/6] docs: IOMMU user API, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v11 2/6] iommu/uapi: Add argsz for user filled data, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v11 3/6] iommu/uapi: Use named union for user data, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v11 4/6] iommu/uapi: Rename uapi functions, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v11 6/6] iommu/vt-d: Check UAPI data processed by IOMMU core, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v11 5/6] iommu/uapi: Handle data and argsz filled by users, Jacob Pan
    • Re: [PATCH v11 5/6] iommu/uapi: Handle data and argsz filled by users, Jean-Philippe Brucker
      • Re: [PATCH v11 5/6] iommu/uapi: Handle data and argsz filled by users, Jacob Pan
• [PATCH v10 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v10 2/3] arch: Wire up trusted_for(2), Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v10 1/3] fs: Add trusted_for(2) syscall implementation and related sysctl, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v10 3/3] selftest/interpreter: Add tests for trusted_for(2) policies, Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH v6 1/6] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH v6 2/6] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
    • Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Edgecombe, Rick P
      • Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        • Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Edgecombe, Rick P
          • Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
            • Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Edgecombe, Rick P
              • Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH v6 4/6] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
    • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Peter Zijlstra
      • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, David Hildenbrand
        • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Peter Zijlstra
          • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mark Rutland
            • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Tycho Andersen
            • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
          • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
        • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
      • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
        • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Peter Zijlstra
          • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Dave Hansen
          • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
            • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Peter Zijlstra
              • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
                • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, James Bottomley
                  • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, David Hildenbrand
                    • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, James Bottomley
                      • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, David Hildenbrand
                • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Matthew Wilcox
                  • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
          • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, James Bottomley
          • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
            • Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Peter Zijlstra
  • [PATCH v6 6/6] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2), Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call, Mike Rapoport
    • Re: [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call, Alejandro Colomar
      • Re: [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call, Alejandro Colomar
        • Re: [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call, Mike Rapoport
          • [PATCH v2] memfd_secret.2: New page describing memfd_secret() system call, Alejandro Colomar
            • Re: [PATCH v2] memfd_secret.2: New page describing memfd_secret() system call, Mike Rapoport
  • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Andrew Morton
    • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
  • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Hagen Paul Pfeifer
    • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
      • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Hagen Paul Pfeifer
        • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
          • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Hagen Paul Pfeifer
            • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
              • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Hagen Paul Pfeifer
  • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
    • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
    • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
      • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
          • Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
• [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 2/6] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH 2/6] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH 2/6] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Kees Cook
        • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
          • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Kees Cook
            • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
        • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Jann Horn
          • RE: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, David Laight
            • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Jann Horn
    • Message not available
      • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
        • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
  • [PATCH 6/6] [DEBUG] seccomp: Report bitmap coverage ranges, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 1/6] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH 1/6] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH 1/6] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results, Kees Cook
        • Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results, Paul Moore
          • Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results, Kees Cook
            • Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results, Paul Moore
              • Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results, Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Rasmus Villemoes
    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
      • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Rasmus Villemoes
        • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
          • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
            • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Kees Cook
              • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, YiFei Zhu
    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Jann Horn
  • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Andrea Arcangeli
    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Jann Horn
    • Message not available
      • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Tianyin Xu
    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps, Kees Cook
• selftests: pidfd: pidfd_wait hangs on linux next kernel on all devices, Naresh Kamboju
  • Re: selftests: pidfd: pidfd_wait hangs on linux next kernel on all devices, Christian Brauner
    • Re: selftests: pidfd: pidfd_wait hangs on linux next kernel on all devices, Christian Brauner
      • Re: selftests: pidfd: pidfd_wait hangs on linux next kernel on all devices, Naresh Kamboju
      • Re: selftests: pidfd: pidfd_wait hangs on linux next kernel on all devices, Naresh Kamboju
        • Re: selftests: pidfd: pidfd_wait hangs on linux next kernel on all devices, Christian Brauner
• [PATCH v10 0/7] IOMMU user API enhancement, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v10 2/7] iommu/uapi: Add argsz for user filled data, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v10 1/7] docs: IOMMU user API, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v10 4/7] iommu/uapi: Use named union for user data, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v10 6/7] iommu/uapi: Handle data and argsz filled by users, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v10 7/7] iommu/vt-d: Check UAPI data processed by IOMMU core, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v10 5/7] iommu/uapi: Rename uapi functions, Jacob Pan
  • [PATCH v10 3/7] iommu/uapi: Introduce enum type for PASID data format, Jacob Pan
• [PATCH v12 0/8] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
    • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Randy Dunlap
      • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Pavel Machek
        • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, H.J. Lu
          • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Pavel Machek
            • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, H.J. Lu
        • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu, Yu-cheng
          • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Pavel Machek
            • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, H.J. Lu
              • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Pavel Machek
            • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu, Yu-cheng
              • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Dave Hansen
                • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu, Yu-cheng
                  • Message not available
                    • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu, Yu-cheng
                • Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Pavel Machek
  • [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Yu-cheng Yu
    • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Dave Hansen
      • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Pavel Machek
        • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, H.J. Lu
          • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Dave Hansen
            • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, H.J. Lu
              • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Dave Hansen
        • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Yu, Yu-cheng
          • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Pavel Machek
    • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Yu, Yu-cheng
        • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Yu-cheng Yu
          • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Andy Lutomirski
            • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Sean Christopherson
              • Message not available
                • Message not available
                  • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Yu, Yu-cheng
                    • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Andy Lutomirski
                      • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Dave Hansen
            • Message not available
              • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Andy Lutomirski
                • Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled, Yu, Yu-cheng
  • [PATCH v12 4/8] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 5/8] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 7/8] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 6/8] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH v12 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property(), Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff(), Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack., Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET), Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  • [PATCH v12 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 109/330] selftests/ftrace: fix glob selftest, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 318/330] selftests/x86/syscall_nt: Clear weird flags after each test, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 063/206] selftests/ftrace: fix glob selftest, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 200/206] selftests/x86/syscall_nt: Clear weird flags after each test, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 035/127] selftests/ftrace: fix glob selftest, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.9 89/90] selftests/x86/syscall_nt: Clear weird flags after each test, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 125/127] selftests/x86/syscall_nt: Clear weird flags after each test, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 200/330] selftests/ptrace: add test cases for dead-locks, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 071/330] selftests/bpf: De-flake test_tcpbpf, Sasha Levin
• improve compat handling for the i386 u64 alignment quirk v3, Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 1/3] compat: lift compat_s64 and compat_u64 to <asm-generic/compat.h>, Christoph Hellwig
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] compat: lift compat_s64 and compat_u64 to <asm-generic/compat.h>, Arnd Bergmann
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] compat: lift compat_s64 and compat_u64 to <asm-generic/compat.h>, Al Viro
  • [PATCH 2/3] compat: add a compat_need_64bit_alignment_fixup() helper, Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH 3/3] quota: simplify the quotactl compat handling, Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, madvenka
  • [PATCH v2 4/4] [RFC] arm/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor, madvenka
  • [PATCH v2 2/4] [RFC] x86/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor, madvenka
  • [PATCH v2 3/4] [RFC] arm64/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor, madvenka
  • [PATCH v2 1/4] [RFC] fs/trampfd: Implement the trampoline file descriptor API, madvenka
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Florian Weimer
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Florian Weimer
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Arvind Sankar
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Arvind Sankar
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
            • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Arvind Sankar
              • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
              • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
                • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Florian Weimer
                  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
                    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
                • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Pavel Machek
                • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Arvind Sankar
                  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
                    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Arvind Sankar
                      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, madvenka
    • [PATCH v2 1/4] [RFC] fs/trampfd: Implement the trampoline file descriptor API, madvenka
    • [PATCH v2 2/4] [RFC] x86/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor, madvenka
    • [PATCH v2 4/4] [RFC] arm/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor, madvenka
    • [PATCH v2 3/4] [RFC] arm64/trampfd: Provide support for the trampoline file descriptor, madvenka
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Pavel Machek
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Solar Designer
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Solar Designer
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Pavel Machek
            • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Solar Designer
              • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Solar Designer
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Florian Weimer
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Andy Lutomirski
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Solar Designer
            • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Arvind Sankar
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Pavel Machek
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Pavel Machek
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Madhavan T. Venkataraman
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Pavel Machek
              • Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] [RFC] Implement Trampoline File Descriptor, Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
  • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Andy Lutomirski
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
    • [PATCH v5 1/5] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER, Mike Rapoport
    • [PATCH v5 2/5] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global, Mike Rapoport
    • [PATCH v5 3/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
      • Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Randy Dunlap
    • [PATCH v5 4/5] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant, Mike Rapoport
    • [PATCH v5 5/5] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
    • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Andrew Morton
      • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
        • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
      • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
    • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Qian Cai
      • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Qian Cai
        • Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Stephen Rothwell
• [PATCH v2 0/2] changes for addding fchmodat2 syscall, Rich Felker
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Rich Felker
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Greg KH
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Christoph Hellwig
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Rich Felker
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Christoph Hellwig
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Rich Felker
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Al Viro
        • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Al Viro
          • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Rich Felker
          • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks, Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Rich Felker
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Aleksa Sarai
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Greg KH
• [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
  • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
    • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Michal Hocko
      • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
        • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, minchan
        • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Michal Hocko
          • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Minchan Kim
            • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
          • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
            • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
              • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Michal Hocko
                • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
                • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Minchan Kim
                  • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
                    • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Minchan Kim
                  • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Michal Hocko
                    • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Minchan Kim
                      • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Michal Hocko
                        • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
                          • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Minchan Kim
                          • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Michal Hocko
                            • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
                              • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Minchan Kim
                              • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Michal Hocko
                                • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
                                • Re: [RFC]: userspace memory reaping, Suren Baghdasaryan
• [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Matthew Wilcox
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Matthew Wilcox
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Al Viro
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Matthew Wilcox
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Igor Zhbanov
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), James Morris
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 0/3] Add introspect_access(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
  • Message not available
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v9 2/3] arch: Wire up introspect_access(2), Arnd Bergmann
• [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Rich Felker
  • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Al Viro
    • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Rich Felker
  • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Christoph Hellwig
    • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Rich Felker
      • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Christoph Hellwig
        • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Rich Felker
          • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Christoph Hellwig
  • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Greg KH
    • Re: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, Rich Felker
  • RE: [PATCH] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall, David Laight
• Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
  • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Dave Hansen
    • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
      • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Michal Hocko
        • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
          • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Michal Hocko
            • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
              • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Dave Hansen
                • RE: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Luck, Tony
                  • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
                    • RE: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Luck, Tony
                      • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
              • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Michal Hocko
                • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
  • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Dave Hansen
  • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Gerald Schaefer
    • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
      • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Greg KH
        • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
      • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, Michal Hocko
        • Re: Ways to deprecate /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryX/phys_device ?, David Hildenbrand
• [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v8 3/3] selftest/interpreter: Add tests for AT_INTERPRETED enforcing, Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v8 2/3] fs,doc: Enable to configure exec checks for AT_INTERPRETED, Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mimi Zohar
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Stephen Smalley
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Stephen Smalley
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mimi Zohar
              • Message not available
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mickaël Salaün
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2), Mimi Zohar
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Al Viro
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Matthew Wilcox
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Thibaut Sautereau
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Al Viro
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC), James Morris
• [PATCH v10 0/6] ACPI: Support Generic Initiator proximity domains, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v10 1/6] ACPI: Support Generic Initiator only domains, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v10 3/6] ACPI: Let ACPI know we support Generic Initiator Affinity Structures, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v10 4/6] ACPI: HMAT: Fix handling of changes from ACPI 6.2 to ACPI 6.3, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v10 6/6] docs: mm: numaperf.rst Add brief description for access class 1., Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v10 5/6] node: Add access1 class to represent CPU to memory characteristics, Jonathan Cameron
  • [PATCH v10 2/6] x86: Support Generic Initiator only proximity domains, Jonathan Cameron
    • Re: [PATCH v10 2/6] x86: Support Generic Initiator only proximity domains, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v10 2/6] x86: Support Generic Initiator only proximity domains, Jonathan Cameron
        • Re: [PATCH v10 2/6] x86: Support Generic Initiator only proximity domains, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [PATCH v10 0/6] ACPI: Support Generic Initiator proximity domains, Jonathan Cameron
• [PATCH 6/9] ARM: oabi-compat: rework sys_semtimedop emulation, Arnd Bergmann
• [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, James Bottomley
  • [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Greg KH
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Greg KH
        • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Greg KH
    • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Greg KH
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, James Bottomley
        • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Greg KH
          • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, James Bottomley
              • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Greg KH
                • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Jarkko Sakkinen
              • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, James Bottomley
    • [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, James Bottomley
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Greg KH
      • RE: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Elliott, Robert (Servers)
        • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, James Bottomley
          • RE: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Elliott, Robert (Servers)
            • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, James Bottomley
            • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Ken Goldman
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 1/1] tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Greg KH
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND v4 0/1] add sysfs exports for TPM 2 PCR registers, James Bottomley
• [PATCH RESEND 1/4] scsi: sg: fix BLKSECTGET ioctl, Tom Yan
  • [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
  • [PATCH RESEND 3/4] scsi: sg: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
  • [PATCH RESEND 4/4] block/scsi_ioctl.c: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH RESEND 1/4] scsi: sg: fix BLKSECTGET ioctl, Tom Yan
    • [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Christoph Hellwig
        • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
          • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Christoph Hellwig
            • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
              • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Christoph Hellwig
                • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
                  • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Christoph Hellwig
                    • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Douglas Gilbert
                      • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Alan Stern
                    • Re: [PATCH RESEND 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
    • [PATCH RESEND 3/4] scsi: sg: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
      • Re: [PATCH RESEND 3/4] scsi: sg: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Greg KH
        • Re: [PATCH RESEND 3/4] scsi: sg: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
          • [PATCH v2 1/4] scsi: sg: fix BLKSECTGET ioctl, Tom Yan
            • [PATCH v2 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
            • [PATCH v2 3/4] scsi: sg: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
            • [PATCH v2 4/4] block/scsi_ioctl.c: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
          • [PATCH v3 1/4] scsi: sg: fix BLKSECTGET ioctl, Tom Yan
            • [PATCH v3 2/4] scsi: sg: implement BLKSSZGET, Tom Yan
            • [PATCH v3 3/4] scsi: sg: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
            • [PATCH v3 4/4] block/scsi_ioctl.c: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
    • [PATCH RESEND 4/4] block/scsi_ioctl.c: use queue_logical_sector_size() in max_sectors_bytes(), Tom Yan
• [PATCH v6 0/9] Syscall User Dispatch, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
  • [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Christian Brauner
      • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
        • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, peterz
      • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
        • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Peter Zijlstra
    • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
        • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Thomas Gleixner
            • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
              • Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry, Christian Brauner
      • Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry, Andy Lutomirski
        • Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry, Christian Brauner
          • Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry, Andy Lutomirski
    • Re: [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry, peterz
  • [PATCH v6 7/9] x86: Enable Syscall User Dispatch, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 7/9] x86: Enable Syscall User Dispatch, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 7/9] x86: Enable Syscall User Dispatch, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
  • [PATCH v6 8/9] selftests: Add kselftest for syscall user dispatch, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 8/9] selftests: Add kselftest for syscall user dispatch, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 9/9] doc: Document Syscall User Dispatch, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 9/9] doc: Document Syscall User Dispatch, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 3/9] x86: vdso: Expose sigreturn address on vdso to the kernel, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 3/9] x86: vdso: Expose sigreturn address on vdso to the kernel, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 5/9] kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 5/9] kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection, Matthew Wilcox
    • Re: [PATCH v6 5/9] kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection, peterz
  • [PATCH v6 2/9] kernel: entry: Support TIF_SYSCAL_INTERCEPT on common entry code, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 2/9] kernel: entry: Support TIF_SYSCAL_INTERCEPT on common entry code, Christian Brauner
    • Re: [PATCH v6 2/9] kernel: entry: Support TIF_SYSCAL_INTERCEPT on common entry code, peterz
      • Re: [PATCH v6 2/9] kernel: entry: Support TIF_SYSCAL_INTERCEPT on common entry code, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
  • [PATCH v6 4/9] signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    • Re: [PATCH v6 4/9] signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type, Christian Brauner
    • Re: [PATCH v6 4/9] signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type, Kees Cook
• [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Adalbert Lazăr
  • [RESEND RFC PATCH 5/5] pidfd_mem: implemented remote memory mapping system call, Adalbert Lazăr
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 5/5] pidfd_mem: implemented remote memory mapping system call, Florian Weimer
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 5/5] pidfd_mem: implemented remote memory mapping system call, Christian Brauner
  • [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Adalbert Lazăr
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Oleg Nesterov
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Oleg Nesterov
      • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Adalbert Lazăr
      • RE: [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
        • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Oleg Nesterov
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Christian Brauner
      • RE: [RESEND RFC PATCH 4/5] mm/remote_mapping: use a pidfd to access memory belonging to unrelated process, Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
  • [RESEND RFC PATCH 3/5] mm/mmu_notifier: remove lockdep map, allow mmu notifier to be used in nested scenarios, Adalbert Lazăr
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 3/5] mm/mmu_notifier: remove lockdep map, allow mmu notifier to be used in nested scenarios, Jason Gunthorpe
  • [RESEND RFC PATCH 2/5] mm: let the VMA decide how zap_pte_range() acts on mapped pages, Adalbert Lazăr
  • [RESEND RFC PATCH 1/5] mm: add atomic capability to zap_details, Adalbert Lazăr
  • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Jason Gunthorpe
    • RE: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
      • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Jason Gunthorpe
        • RE: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
          • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Jason Gunthorpe
            • RE: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
              • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Jason Gunthorpe
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Matthew Wilcox
      • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Jason Gunthorpe
      • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Paolo Bonzini
      • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Jason Gunthorpe
  • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Florian Weimer
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Paolo Bonzini
      • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Christian Brauner
  • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Andy Lutomirski
    • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Paolo Bonzini
      • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Andy Lutomirski
        • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Paolo Bonzini
          • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Andy Lutomirski
            • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Paolo Bonzini
              • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Christian Brauner
            • RE: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Mircea CIRJALIU - MELIU
          • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Christoph Hellwig
            • Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/5] Remote mapping, Paolo Bonzini