Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and
IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
This is the second part of CET and enables Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT).
It is built on top of the shadow stack series.
Changes in v14:
- Drop vsyscall fixup patch, as this needs more discussion and testing.
I will send this out separately.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32-
architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v13.
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200925145804.5821-1-yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx/
H.J. Lu (3):
x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking
x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point
x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
Yu-cheng Yu (4):
x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support
x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking
x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
arch/x86/Kconfig | 21 +++++++
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 8 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 17 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 8 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 +++
.../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++-
11 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--
2.21.0
