On 9/30/2020 6:10 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 6:01 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 4:44 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
[...]
From 09803e66dca38d7784e32687d0693550948199ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 14:15:38 -0800
Subject: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and
Indirect Branch
Tracking for vsyscall emulation
Vsyscall entry points are effectively branch targets. Mark them with
ENDBR64 opcodes. When emulating the RET instruction, unwind shadow stack
and reset IBT state machine.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
---
v13:
- Check shadow stack address is canonical.
- Change from writing to MSRs to writing to CET xstate.
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 ++++++
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_trace.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index 44c33103a955..30b166091d46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "vsyscall_trace.h"
@@ -286,6 +289,44 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
/* Emulate a ret instruction. */
regs->ip = caller;
regs->sp += 8;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+ if (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size || tsk->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
+ struct cet_user_state *cet;
+ struct fpu *fpu;
+
+ fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu;
+ fpregs_lock();
+
+ if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) {
+ copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(fpu);
+ set_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD);
+ }
+
+ cet = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+ if (!cet) {
+ /*
+ * This should not happen. The task is
+ * CET-enabled, but CET xstate is in INIT.
+ */
[...]
For what it's worth, I think there is an alternative. If you all
(userspace people, etc) can come up with a credible way for a user
program to statically declare that it doesn't need vsyscalls, then we
could make SHSTK depend on *that*, and we could avoid this mess. This
breaks orthogonality, but it's probably a decent outcome.
Would an arch_prctl(DISABLE_VSYSCALL) work? The kernel then sets a
thread flag, and in emulate_vsyscall(), checks the flag.
When CET is enabled, ld-linux will do DISABLE_VSYSCALL.
How is that?
Backwards, no? Presumably vsyscall needs to be disabled before or
concurrently with CET being enabled, not after.
I think the solution of making vsyscall emulation work correctly with
CET is going to be better and possibly more straightforward.
We can do
1. Add ARCH_X86_DISABLE_VSYSCALL to disable the vsyscall page.
2. If CPU supports CET and the program is CET enabled:
a. Disable the vsyscall page.
b. Pass control to user.
c. Enable the vsyscall page when ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE is called.
So when control is passed from kernel to user, the vsyscall page is
disabled if the program
is CET enabled.
Let me say this one more time:
If we have a per-process vsyscall disable control and a per-process
CET control, we are going to keep those settings orthogonal. I'm
willing to entertain an option in which enabling SHSTK without also
disabling vsyscalls is disallowed, We are *not* going to have any CET
flags magically disable vsyscalls, though, and we are not going to
have a situation where disabling vsyscalls on process startup requires
enabling SHSTK.
Any possible static vsyscall controls (and CET controls, for that
matter) also need to come with some explanation of whether they are
properties set on the ELF loader, the ELF program being loaded, or
both. And this explanation needs to cover what happens when old
binaries link against new libc versions and vice versa. A new
CET-enabled binary linked against old libc running on a new kernel
that is expected to work on a non-CET CPU MUST work on a CET CPU, too.
Right now, literally the only thing preventing vsyscall emulation from
coexisting with SHSTK is that the implementation eeds work.
So your proposal is rejected. Sorry.
I think, even with shadow stack/ibt enabled, we can still allow XONLY
without too much mess.
What about this?
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
======
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index 8b0b32ac7791..d39da0a15521 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -48,16 +48,16 @@
static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode __ro_after_init =
#ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
NONE;
-#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY)
+#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY) || defined(CONFIG_X86_CET)
XONLY;
-#else
+#else
EMULATE;
#endif
static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
{
if (str) {
- if (!strcmp("emulate", str))
+ if (!strcmp("emulate", str) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_CET))
vsyscall_mode = EMULATE;
else if (!strcmp("xonly", str))
vsyscall_mode = XONLY;
