On 03/06/2018 11:28 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 28/02/2018 01:09, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:00 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> >>> On 28/02/2018 00:23, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think you're wrong here. Any sane container trying to use Landlock >>>>> like this would also create a PID namespace. Problem solved. I still >>>>> think you should drop this patch. >>> >>> Containers is one use case, another is build-in sandboxing (e.g. for web >>> browser…) and another one is for sandbox managers (e.g. Firejail, >>> Bubblewrap, Flatpack…). In some of these use cases, especially from a >>> developer point of view, you may want/need to debug your applications >>> (without requiring to be root). For nested Landlock access-controls >>> (e.g. container + user session + web browser), it may not be allowed to >>> create a PID namespace, but you still want to have a meaningful >>> access-control. >>> >> >> The consideration should be exactly the same as for normal seccomp. >> If I'm in a container (using PID namespaces + seccomp) and a run a web >> browser, I can debug the browser. >> >> If there's a real use case for adding this type of automatic ptrace >> protection, then by all means, let's add it as a general seccomp >> feature. >> > > Right, it makes sense to add this feature to seccomp filters as well. > What do you think Kees? > As a second though, it may be useful for seccomp but it should be another patch series, independent from this one. The idea to keep in mind is that this ptrace restriction is an automatic way to define what is called a subject in common access control vocabulary, like used by SELinux. A subject should not be able to impersonate another one with less restrictions (to get more rights). Because of the stackable restrictions of Landlock (same principle used by seccomp), it is easy to identify which subject (i.e. group of processes) is more restricted (or with different restrictions) than another. This follow the same principle as Yama's ptrace_scope. Another important argument for a different ptrace-protection mechanism than seccomp is that Landlock programs may be applied (i.e. define subject) otherwise than with a process hierarchy. Another way to define a Landlock subject may be by using cgroups (which was previously discussed). I'm also thinking about being able to create (real) capabilities (not to be confused with POSIX capabilities), which may be useful to implement some parts of Capsicum, by attaching Landlock programs to a file descriptor (and not directly to a group of processes). All this to highlight that the ptrace protection is specific to Landlock and may not be directly shared with seccomp. Even if Landlock follows the footprints of seccomp, they are different beasts.
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