On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:00 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On 28/02/2018 00:23, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> >>> >>> I think you're wrong here. Any sane container trying to use Landlock >>> like this would also create a PID namespace. Problem solved. I still >>> think you should drop this patch. > > Containers is one use case, another is build-in sandboxing (e.g. for web > browser…) and another one is for sandbox managers (e.g. Firejail, > Bubblewrap, Flatpack…). In some of these use cases, especially from a > developer point of view, you may want/need to debug your applications > (without requiring to be root). For nested Landlock access-controls > (e.g. container + user session + web browser), it may not be allowed to > create a PID namespace, but you still want to have a meaningful > access-control. > The consideration should be exactly the same as for normal seccomp. If I'm in a container (using PID namespaces + seccomp) and a run a web browser, I can debug the browser. If there's a real use case for adding this type of automatic ptrace protection, then by all means, let's add it as a general seccomp feature. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
