On 28/02/2018 01:09, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:00 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> On 28/02/2018 00:23, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think you're wrong here. Any sane container trying to use Landlock >>>> like this would also create a PID namespace. Problem solved. I still >>>> think you should drop this patch. >> >> Containers is one use case, another is build-in sandboxing (e.g. for web >> browser…) and another one is for sandbox managers (e.g. Firejail, >> Bubblewrap, Flatpack…). In some of these use cases, especially from a >> developer point of view, you may want/need to debug your applications >> (without requiring to be root). For nested Landlock access-controls >> (e.g. container + user session + web browser), it may not be allowed to >> create a PID namespace, but you still want to have a meaningful >> access-control. >> > > The consideration should be exactly the same as for normal seccomp. > If I'm in a container (using PID namespaces + seccomp) and a run a web > browser, I can debug the browser. > > If there's a real use case for adding this type of automatic ptrace > protection, then by all means, let's add it as a general seccomp > feature. > Right, it makes sense to add this feature to seccomp filters as well. What do you think Kees?
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