On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 12:04 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:56 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:33 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:51 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>> On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:32 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>> > On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> Write the filter, then smp_mb (or maybe a weaker barrier is okay), >>>>>>>>> >> then set the bit. >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > Yes, exactly, this is what I meant. Plas rmb() in __secure_computing(). >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > But I still can't understand the rest of your discussion about the >>>>>>>>> > ordering we need ;) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Let me try again from scratch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Currently there are three relevant variables: TIF_SECCOMP, >>>>>>>>> seccomp.mode, and seccomp.filter. __secure_computing needs >>>>>>>>> seccomp.mode and seccomp.filter to be in sync, and it wants (but >>>>>>>>> doesn't really need) TIF_SECCOMP to be in sync as well. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My suggestion is to rearrange it a bit. Move mode into seccomp.filter >>>>>>>>> (so that filter == NULL implies no seccomp) and don't check >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This would require that we reimplement mode 1 seccomp via mode 2 >>>>>>> filters. Which isn't too hard, but may add complexity. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> TIF_SECCOMP in secure_computing. Then turning on seccomp is entirely >>>>>>>>> atomic except for the fact that the seccomp hooks won't be called if >>>>>>>>> filter != NULL but !TIF_SECCOMP. This removes all ordering >>>>>>>>> requirements. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah, got it, thanks. Perhaps I missed somehing, but to me this looks like >>>>>>>> unnecessary complication at first glance. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We alredy have TIF_SECCOMP, we need it anyway, and we should only care >>>>>>>> about the case when this bit is actually set, so that we can race with >>>>>>>> the 1st call of __secure_computing(). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Otherwise we are fine: we can miss the new filter anyway, ->mode can't >>>>>>>> be changed it is already nonzero. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Alternatively, __secure_computing could still BUG_ON(!seccomp.filter). >>>>>>>>> In that case, filter needs to be set before TIF_SECCOMP is set, but >>>>>>>>> that's straightforward. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yep. And this is how seccomp_assign_mode() already works? It is called >>>>>>>> after we change ->filter chain, it changes ->mode before set(TIF_SECCOMP) >>>>>>>> just it lacks a barrier. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Right, I think the best solution is to add the barrier. I was >>>>>>> concerned that adding the read barrier in secure_computing would have >>>>>>> a performance impact, though. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I can't speak for ARM, but I think that all of the read barriers are >>>>>> essentially free on x86. (smp_mb is a very different story, but that >>>>>> shouldn't be needed here.) >>>>> >>>>> It looks like SMP ARM issues dsb for rmb, which seems a bit expensive. >>>>> http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.dui0204g/CIHJFGFE.html >>>>> >>>>> If I skip the rmb in the secure_computing call before checking mode, >>>>> it sounds like I run the risk of racing an out-of-order TIF_SECCOMP vs >>>>> mode and filter. This seems unlikely to me, given an addition of the >>>>> smp_mb__before_atomic() during the seccomp_assign_mode()? I guess I >>>>> don't have a sense of how aggressively ARM might do data caching in >>>>> this area. Could the other thread actually see TIF_SECCOMP get set but >>>>> still have an out of date copy of seccomp.mode? >>>>> >>>>> I really want to avoid adding anything to the secure_computing() >>>>> execution path. :( >>>> >>>> Hence my suggestion to make the ordering not matter. No ordering >>>> requirement, no barriers. >>> >>> I may be misunderstanding something, but I think there's still an >>> ordering problem. We'll have TIF_SECCOMP already, so if we enter >>> secure_computing with a NULL filter, we'll kill the process. >>> >>> Merging .mode and .filter would remove one of the race failure paths: >>> having TIF_SECCOMP and not having a mode set (leading to BUG). With >>> the merge, we could still race and land in the same place as have >>> TIF_SECCOMP and mode==2, but filter==NULL, leading to WARN and kill. >> >> You could just make secure_computing do nothing if filter == NULL. >> It's probably faster to test that than TIF_SECCOMP anyway, since you >> need to read the filter cacheline regardless, and testing a regular >> variable for non-NULLness might be faster than an atomic bit test >> operation. (Or may not -- I don't know.) > > I am uncomfortable about making filter == NULL be a "fail open" > condition if TIF_SECCOMP is set. I'm unconvinced here. TIF_SECCOMP unset is already a fail-open condition if filter is set. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
