On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:33 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:51 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:32 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> > On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Write the filter, then smp_mb (or maybe a weaker barrier is okay), >>>>> >> then set the bit. >>>>> > >>>>> > Yes, exactly, this is what I meant. Plas rmb() in __secure_computing(). >>>>> > >>>>> > But I still can't understand the rest of your discussion about the >>>>> > ordering we need ;) >>>>> >>>>> Let me try again from scratch. >>>>> >>>>> Currently there are three relevant variables: TIF_SECCOMP, >>>>> seccomp.mode, and seccomp.filter. __secure_computing needs >>>>> seccomp.mode and seccomp.filter to be in sync, and it wants (but >>>>> doesn't really need) TIF_SECCOMP to be in sync as well. >>>>> >>>>> My suggestion is to rearrange it a bit. Move mode into seccomp.filter >>>>> (so that filter == NULL implies no seccomp) and don't check >>> >>> This would require that we reimplement mode 1 seccomp via mode 2 >>> filters. Which isn't too hard, but may add complexity. >>> >>>>> TIF_SECCOMP in secure_computing. Then turning on seccomp is entirely >>>>> atomic except for the fact that the seccomp hooks won't be called if >>>>> filter != NULL but !TIF_SECCOMP. This removes all ordering >>>>> requirements. >>>> >>>> Ah, got it, thanks. Perhaps I missed somehing, but to me this looks like >>>> unnecessary complication at first glance. >>>> >>>> We alredy have TIF_SECCOMP, we need it anyway, and we should only care >>>> about the case when this bit is actually set, so that we can race with >>>> the 1st call of __secure_computing(). >>>> >>>> Otherwise we are fine: we can miss the new filter anyway, ->mode can't >>>> be changed it is already nonzero. >>>> >>>>> Alternatively, __secure_computing could still BUG_ON(!seccomp.filter). >>>>> In that case, filter needs to be set before TIF_SECCOMP is set, but >>>>> that's straightforward. >>>> >>>> Yep. And this is how seccomp_assign_mode() already works? It is called >>>> after we change ->filter chain, it changes ->mode before set(TIF_SECCOMP) >>>> just it lacks a barrier. >>> >>> Right, I think the best solution is to add the barrier. I was >>> concerned that adding the read barrier in secure_computing would have >>> a performance impact, though. >>> >> >> I can't speak for ARM, but I think that all of the read barriers are >> essentially free on x86. (smp_mb is a very different story, but that >> shouldn't be needed here.) > > It looks like SMP ARM issues dsb for rmb, which seems a bit expensive. > http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.dui0204g/CIHJFGFE.html > > If I skip the rmb in the secure_computing call before checking mode, > it sounds like I run the risk of racing an out-of-order TIF_SECCOMP vs > mode and filter. This seems unlikely to me, given an addition of the > smp_mb__before_atomic() during the seccomp_assign_mode()? I guess I > don't have a sense of how aggressively ARM might do data caching in > this area. Could the other thread actually see TIF_SECCOMP get set but > still have an out of date copy of seccomp.mode? > > I really want to avoid adding anything to the secure_computing() > execution path. :( Hence my suggestion to make the ordering not matter. No ordering requirement, no barriers. --Andy > > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
