On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 11:37:43AM +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> On 2013-03-07 09:57, Gleb Natapov wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 09:53:49AM +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> >> On 2013-03-07 09:43, Gleb Natapov wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 09:12:19AM +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> >>>> On 2013-03-07 08:51, Gleb Natapov wrote:
> >>>>> On Mon, Mar 04, 2013 at 08:40:29PM +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> >>>>>> The logic for calculating the value with which we call kvm_set_cr0/4 was
> >>>>>> broken (will definitely be visible with nested unrestricted guest mode
> >>>>>> support). Also, we performed the check regarding CR0_ALWAYSON too early
> >>>>>> when in guest mode.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> What really needs to be done on both CR0 and CR4 is to mask out L1-owned
> >>>>>> bits and merge them in from GUEST_CR0/4. In contrast, arch.cr0/4 and
> >>>>>> arch.cr0/4_guest_owned_bits contain the mangled L0+L1 state and, thus,
> >>>>>> are not suited as input.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> For both CRs, we can then apply the check against VMXON_CRx_ALWAYSON and
> >>>>>> refuse the update if it fails. To be fully consistent, we implement this
> >>>>>> check now also for CR4.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Finally, we have to set the shadow to the value L2 wanted to write
> >>>>>> originally.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> >>>>>> ---
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Changes in v2:
> >>>>>> - keep the non-misleading part of the comment in handle_set_cr0
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> >>>>>> 1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> >>>>>> index 7cc566b..832b7b4 100644
> >>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> >>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> >>>>>> @@ -4605,37 +4605,53 @@ vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
> >>>>>> /* called to set cr0 as appropriate for a mov-to-cr0 exit. */
> >>>>>> static int handle_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
> >>>>>> {
> >>>>>> - if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon &&
> >>>>>> - ((val & VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON) != VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON))
> >>>>>> - return 1;
> >>>>>> -
> >>>>>> if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
> >>>>>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
> >>>>>> + unsigned long orig_val = val;
> >>>>>> +
> >>>>>> /*
> >>>>>> * We get here when L2 changed cr0 in a way that did not change
> >>>>>> * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr),
> >>>>>> - * but did change L0 shadowed bits. This can currently happen
> >>>>>> - * with the TS bit: L0 may want to leave TS on (for lazy fpu
> >>>>>> - * loading) while pretending to allow the guest to change it.
> >>>>>> + * but did change L0 shadowed bits.
> >>>>>> */
> >>>>>> - if (kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, (val & vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits) |
> >>>>>> - (vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits)))
> >>>>>> + val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
> >>>>>> + (vmcs_read64(GUEST_CR0) & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask);
> >>>>> I think using GUEST_CR0 here is incorrect. It contains combination of bits
> >>>>> set by L2, L1 and L0 and here we need to get only L2/L1 mix which is in
> >>>>> vcpu->arch.cr0 (almost, but good enough for this case). Why vcpu->arch.cr0
> >>>>> contains right L2/L1 mix?
> >>>>
> >>>> L0/L1. E.g., kvm_set_cr0 unconditionally injects X86_CR0_ET and masks
> >>>> out reserved bits. But you are right, GUEST_CR0 isn't much better. And
> >>>> maybe that mangling in kvm_set_cr0 is a corner case we can ignore.
> >>>>
> >>> I think we can. ET is R/O and wired to 1, so it does not matter what
> >>> guest writes there it should be treated as 1. About reserved bits spec
> >>> says that software should write what it reads there and does not specify
> >>> what happens if software does not follow this.
> >>>
> >>>>> Because it was set to vmcs12->guest_cr0 during
> >>>>> L2 #vmentry. While L2 is running three things may happen to CR0:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 1. L2 writes to a bit that is not shadowed neither by L1 nor by L0. It
> >>>>> will go strait to GUEST_CR0.
> >>>>> 2. L2 writes to a bit shadowed by L1. L1 #vmexit will be emulated. On the
> >>>>> next #vmetry vcpu->arch.cr0 will be set to whatever value L1 calculated.
> >>>>> 3. L2 writes to a bit shadowed by L0, but not L1. This is the case we
> >>>>> are handling here. And if we will do it right vcpu->arch.cr0 will be
> >>>>> up-to-date at the end.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The only case when, while this code running, vcpu->arch.cr0 has not
> >>>>> up-to-date value is if 1 happened, but since L2 guest overwriting cr0
> >>>>> here anyway it does not matter what it previously set in GUEST_CR0. The
> >>>>> correct bits are in a new cr0 value provided by val and accessible by
> >>>>> (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask).
> >>>>
> >>>> I need to think about it again. Maybe vmcs12->guest_cr0 is best, but
> >>>> that's a shot from the hips now.
> >>>>
> >>> I do not think it is correct because case 3 does not update it. So if 3
> >>> happens twice without L1 #vmexit between then vmcs12->guest_cr0 will be
> >>> outdated.
> >>
> >> Again, the only thing that matters here is L1's, not L0's view on the
> >> "real" CR0 value. So guest_cr0 is never outdated (/wrt
> >> cr0_guest_host_mask) as it will be updated by L1 in step 2. Even if
> >> arch.cr0 vs. guest_cr0 makes no difference in practice, the latter is
> >> more consistent, so I will go for it unless you can convince me it is wrong.
> >>
> > Hmm, yes you are right that wrt cr0_guest_host_mask guest_cr0 should be
> > up-to-date. Please write a big comment about it.
>
> Will do.
>
> > And what about moving VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON check into vmx_set_cr0()?
>
> That doesn't make much sense for CR0 (due to the differences between
> vmxon and guest mode - and lacking return code of set_cr4). But I can
> consolidate the CR4 checks.
>
Isn't vmxon check is implicit in a guest mode. i.e if is_guest_mode() is
trues then vmxon is on? Return code can be added.
--
Gleb.
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