On 2013-03-07 09:43, Gleb Natapov wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 09:12:19AM +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>> On 2013-03-07 08:51, Gleb Natapov wrote:
>>> On Mon, Mar 04, 2013 at 08:40:29PM +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>>>> The logic for calculating the value with which we call kvm_set_cr0/4 was
>>>> broken (will definitely be visible with nested unrestricted guest mode
>>>> support). Also, we performed the check regarding CR0_ALWAYSON too early
>>>> when in guest mode.
>>>>
>>>> What really needs to be done on both CR0 and CR4 is to mask out L1-owned
>>>> bits and merge them in from GUEST_CR0/4. In contrast, arch.cr0/4 and
>>>> arch.cr0/4_guest_owned_bits contain the mangled L0+L1 state and, thus,
>>>> are not suited as input.
>>>>
>>>> For both CRs, we can then apply the check against VMXON_CRx_ALWAYSON and
>>>> refuse the update if it fails. To be fully consistent, we implement this
>>>> check now also for CR4.
>>>>
>>>> Finally, we have to set the shadow to the value L2 wanted to write
>>>> originally.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> Changes in v2:
>>>> - keep the non-misleading part of the comment in handle_set_cr0
>>>>
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>>> 1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> index 7cc566b..832b7b4 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> @@ -4605,37 +4605,53 @@ vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
>>>> /* called to set cr0 as appropriate for a mov-to-cr0 exit. */
>>>> static int handle_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
>>>> {
>>>> - if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon &&
>>>> - ((val & VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON) != VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON))
>>>> - return 1;
>>>> -
>>>> if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
>>>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
>>>> + unsigned long orig_val = val;
>>>> +
>>>> /*
>>>> * We get here when L2 changed cr0 in a way that did not change
>>>> * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr),
>>>> - * but did change L0 shadowed bits. This can currently happen
>>>> - * with the TS bit: L0 may want to leave TS on (for lazy fpu
>>>> - * loading) while pretending to allow the guest to change it.
>>>> + * but did change L0 shadowed bits.
>>>> */
>>>> - if (kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, (val & vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits) |
>>>> - (vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits)))
>>>> + val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
>>>> + (vmcs_read64(GUEST_CR0) & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask);
>>> I think using GUEST_CR0 here is incorrect. It contains combination of bits
>>> set by L2, L1 and L0 and here we need to get only L2/L1 mix which is in
>>> vcpu->arch.cr0 (almost, but good enough for this case). Why vcpu->arch.cr0
>>> contains right L2/L1 mix?
>>
>> L0/L1. E.g., kvm_set_cr0 unconditionally injects X86_CR0_ET and masks
>> out reserved bits. But you are right, GUEST_CR0 isn't much better. And
>> maybe that mangling in kvm_set_cr0 is a corner case we can ignore.
>>
> I think we can. ET is R/O and wired to 1, so it does not matter what
> guest writes there it should be treated as 1. About reserved bits spec
> says that software should write what it reads there and does not specify
> what happens if software does not follow this.
>
>>> Because it was set to vmcs12->guest_cr0 during
>>> L2 #vmentry. While L2 is running three things may happen to CR0:
>>>
>>> 1. L2 writes to a bit that is not shadowed neither by L1 nor by L0. It
>>> will go strait to GUEST_CR0.
>>> 2. L2 writes to a bit shadowed by L1. L1 #vmexit will be emulated. On the
>>> next #vmetry vcpu->arch.cr0 will be set to whatever value L1 calculated.
>>> 3. L2 writes to a bit shadowed by L0, but not L1. This is the case we
>>> are handling here. And if we will do it right vcpu->arch.cr0 will be
>>> up-to-date at the end.
>>>
>>> The only case when, while this code running, vcpu->arch.cr0 has not
>>> up-to-date value is if 1 happened, but since L2 guest overwriting cr0
>>> here anyway it does not matter what it previously set in GUEST_CR0. The
>>> correct bits are in a new cr0 value provided by val and accessible by
>>> (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask).
>>
>> I need to think about it again. Maybe vmcs12->guest_cr0 is best, but
>> that's a shot from the hips now.
>>
> I do not think it is correct because case 3 does not update it. So if 3
> happens twice without L1 #vmexit between then vmcs12->guest_cr0 will be
> outdated.
Again, the only thing that matters here is L1's, not L0's view on the
"real" CR0 value. So guest_cr0 is never outdated (/wrt
cr0_guest_host_mask) as it will be updated by L1 in step 2. Even if
arch.cr0 vs. guest_cr0 makes no difference in practice, the latter is
more consistent, so I will go for it unless you can convince me it is wrong.
Jan
--
Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RTC ITP SDP-DE
Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
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