On 04/11/2011 06:46 PM, Kuniyasu Suzaki wrote:
>
> But it's a well known issue with colocation and the attack can be
> executed just by looking at raw memory access time (to guess whether
> another process brought something into the cache).
Thank you for comments.
The memory disclosure attack can be prevented by several ways mention in my "Countermeasure" side (Page 22).
If we limit KSM on READ-ONLY pages, we detect and prevent the attack.
I also think most memory deduplication is on READ-ONLY pages.
With EPT or NPT you cannot detect if a page is read only.
Furthermore, at least Linux (without highmem) maps all of memory with a
read/write mapping in addition to the per-process mapping, so no page is
read-only.
--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
