On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 10:43:22AM -0800, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests
> > that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a
> > retpoline+IBPB based approach.
> >
> > To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
> > for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only add_atomic_switch_msr when a
> > non-zero is written to it.
> >
> > Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 +++-
> > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > index 0099e10..dc78095 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
> > /* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */
> > #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2
> > #define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3
> > +#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_SPEC_CTRL 26
> > #define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x)
> >
> > int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > @@ -392,7 +393,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> >
> > /* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
> > const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
> > - KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS);
> > + KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS) | \
> > + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ? KF(SPEC_CTRL) : 0);
>
> Isn't 'boot_cpu_has()' superflous here? And aren't there two bits to
> pass through for existing CPUs (26 and 27)?
>
> >
> > /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
> > get_cpu();
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> > index cdc70a3..dcfe227 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> > @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
> > [CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},
> > [CPUID_7_ECX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_ECX},
> > [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
> > + [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
> > };
> >
> > static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned x86_feature)
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > index aa8638a..1b743a0 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > @@ -920,6 +920,9 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
> > static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
> > u16 error_code);
> > static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> > +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
> > + u32 msr, int type);
> > +
> >
> > static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
> > static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
> > @@ -2007,6 +2010,28 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
> > m->host[i].value = host_val;
> > }
> >
> > +/* do not touch guest_val and host_val if the msr is not found */
> > +static int read_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
> > + u64 *guest_val, u64 *host_val)
> > +{
> > + unsigned i;
> > + struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
> > + if (m->guest[i].index == msr)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + if (i == m->nr)
> > + return 1;
> > +
> > + if (guest_val)
> > + *guest_val = m->guest[i].value;
> > + if (host_val)
> > + *host_val = m->host[i].value;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
> > {
> > u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
> > @@ -3203,7 +3228,9 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > */
> > static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > {
> > + u64 spec_ctrl = 0;
> > struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
> > + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> >
> > switch (msr_info->index) {
> > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> > @@ -3223,6 +3250,19 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> > msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> > + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>
> Shouldn't this conjunct be:
> !(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_STIBP))?
>
> > + return 1;
>
> What if !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)? That should also return 1, I think.
>
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If the MSR is not in the atomic list yet, then it was never
> > + * written to. So the MSR value will be '0'.
> > + */
> > + read_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &spec_ctrl, NULL);
>
> Why not just add msr_ia32_spec_ctrl to struct vcpu_vmx, so that you
> don't have to search the atomic switch list?
>
> > +
> > + msr_info->data = spec_ctrl;
> > + break;
> > case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
> > msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
> > break;
> > @@ -3289,6 +3329,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > int ret = 0;
> > u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
> > u64 data = msr_info->data;
> > + unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * IBRS is not used (yet) to protect the host. Once it does, this
> > + * variable needs to be a bit smarter.
> > + */
> > + u64 host_spec_ctrl = 0;
> >
> > switch (msr_index) {
> > case MSR_EFER:
> > @@ -3330,6 +3377,22 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> > kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> > + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> > + return 1;
>
> This looks incomplete. As above, what if
> !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)?
> If the host doesn't support MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, you'll get a VMX-abort
> on loading the host MSRs from the VM-exit MSR load list.
Yikes, right it will #GP.
>
> Also, what if the value being written is illegal?
You can write garbage and it won't #GP. Granted it should only read
correct values (0,1,2,or 3).
Albeit the spec says nothing about it (except call those regions as reserved
which would imply - rdmsr ifrst and then 'or' it with what you are wrmsr).
That of couse would not be the best choice :-(
