On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, KarimAllah Ahmed wrote:
Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests
that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a
retpoline+IBPB based approach.
To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only add_atomic_switch_msr when a
non-zero is written to it.
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 0099e10..dc78095 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
/* These are scattered features in cpufeatures.h. */
#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4VNNIW 2
#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_AVX512_4FMAPS 3
+#define KVM_CPUID_BIT_SPEC_CTRL 26
#define KF(x) bit(KVM_CPUID_BIT_##x)
int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -392,7 +393,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
- KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS);
+ KF(AVX512_4VNNIW) | KF(AVX512_4FMAPS) | \
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ? KF(SPEC_CTRL) : 0);
Isn't 'boot_cpu_has()' superflous here? And aren't there two bits to
pass through for existing CPUs (26 and 27)?
/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
get_cpu();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index cdc70a3..dcfe227 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},
[CPUID_7_ECX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_ECX},
[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
+ [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
};
static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned x86_feature)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index aa8638a..1b743a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -920,6 +920,9 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
u16 error_code);
static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u32 msr, int type);
+
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
@@ -2007,6 +2010,28 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
m->host[i].value = host_val;
}
+/* do not touch guest_val and host_val if the msr is not found */
+static int read_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
+ u64 *guest_val, u64 *host_val)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
+ if (m->guest[i].index == msr)
+ break;
+
+ if (i == m->nr)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (guest_val)
+ *guest_val = m->guest[i].value;
+ if (host_val)
+ *host_val = m->host[i].value;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
{
u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
@@ -3203,7 +3228,9 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
*/
static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
+ u64 spec_ctrl = 0;
struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
switch (msr_info->index) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -3223,6 +3250,19 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
Shouldn't this conjunct be:
!(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_STIBP))?
+ return 1;
What if !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)? That should also return 1, I think.
+
+ /*
+ * If the MSR is not in the atomic list yet, then it was never
+ * written to. So the MSR value will be '0'.
+ */
+ read_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &spec_ctrl, NULL);
Why not just add msr_ia32_spec_ctrl to struct vcpu_vmx, so that you
don't have to search the atomic switch list?
+
+ msr_info->data = spec_ctrl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
break;
@@ -3289,6 +3329,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
int ret = 0;
u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+
+ /*
+ * IBRS is not used (yet) to protect the host. Once it does, this
+ * variable needs to be a bit smarter.
+ */
+ u64 host_spec_ctrl = 0;
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_EFER:
@@ -3330,6 +3377,22 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ return 1;
This looks incomplete. As above, what if
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)?
If the host doesn't support MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, you'll get a VMX-abort
on loading the host MSRs from the VM-exit MSR load list.
Also, what if the value being written is illegal?
/*
* Processors that support IBRS but not STIBP
* (CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0):EDX[27:26] = 01b) will
* ignore attempts to set STIBP instead of causing an
* exception due to setting that reserved bit.
*/
if ((data & ~(u64)(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP)) ||
((data & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)))
return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we know that the guest is actually using the MSR, so
+ * atomically load and save the SPEC_CTRL MSR and pass it
+ * through to the guest.
+ */
+ add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr_info->data,
+ host_spec_ctrl);
+ msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
I assume you mean MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL rather than MSR_FS_BASE.
Also, what if the host and the guest support a different set of bits
in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, due to a userspace modification of the guest's
CPUID info?
+
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
--
2.7.4
Where do you preserve the guest's MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL value on VM-exit,
if the guest has been given permission to write the MSR?
You also have to clear the guest's MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL on
vmx_vcpu_reset, don't you?
