Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support

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On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 4:58 PM, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> Add MSR passthrough for MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD and place branch predictor
> barriers on switching between VMs to avoid inter VM Spectre-v2 attacks.
>
> [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite]
> [karahmed: - rebase
>            - vmx: expose PRED_CMD whenever it is available
>            - svm: only pass through IBPB if it is available]
> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |  4 ++++
>  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 2744b973..c886e46 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
>         struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
>
>         struct page *save_area;
> +       struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
>  };
>
>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
> @@ -918,6 +919,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
>
>                 set_msr_interception(msrpm, direct_access_msrs[i].index, 1, 1);
>         }
> +
> +       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
> +               set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 1, 1);

What if the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_IBPB?

>  }
>
>  static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
> @@ -1706,11 +1710,17 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>         __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
>         kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
>         kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
> +       /*
> +        * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
> +        * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now.
> +        */
> +       indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
>  }
>
>  static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
>  {
>         struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +       struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
>         int i;
>
>         if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
> @@ -1739,6 +1749,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
>         if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
>                 wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
>
> +       if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
> +               sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> +               indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
> +       }
>         avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
>  }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index dac564d..f82a44c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -2296,6 +2296,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
>         if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
>                 per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
>                 vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
> +               indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
>         }
>
>         if (!already_loaded) {
> @@ -9613,6 +9614,9 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
>                 goto free_msrs;
>
>         msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
> +
> +       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
> +               vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_RW);

What if the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_IBPB?

>         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
>         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
>         vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> --
> 2.7.4
>



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