On 15 Apr 2020, at 18:42, Keith Moore <moore@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
set out quite a 'hard' set of requirements; that by and large match the manifest/expectations of the CCC, de Waag and similar more activist/vigilant privacy groups: (I picked the DE one, as I could not find english version of the substancially similar NL, FR, SE and DK versions) and designs such as de DP3T design (with a few nits and warts) by and large meet those requirements. This is done by de-centralizing; and essentially constructing the cryptography such that only 'on' the phone is it possible to reconstruct 'has there been a contact' and limiting the scope/purpose to exactly that - have I been close. So no location, no tracking, no recording of position, etc. And with sufficient means for an outside observer to verify this. The apple/google proposals are very similar - but are not as limited in `time and place'; potentially more generic. Now obviously - there is nothing stopping someone of using the very same spec to accomplish something different; to spike the app, put hidden code in it, etc, etc. But that is something that we have any way - those that control the phone in your pocket can put a spy in your pocket. Dw |
