I don't much care, but we've moved to "forward secrecy" in TLS 1.3.
-Ekr
On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 5:17 PM, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
DanielHi,
Thanks Tim and Uri for the comment. At least wikipedia considers them as equivalent. I am fine either way, but leave it as pfs unless there is a consensus to change it to forward secrecy. If having fs seems important to you please let us know asap!
Yours,On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:It is a mathematical cryptographic term, and as such is incontrovertible.
I say leave it in.
Regards,
Uri
Sent from my iPhone
> On May 18, 2017, at 16:58, Timothy Jackson <tjackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> One small nit.
>
>> ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy
> I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just “forward secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach?
>
> Tim
> —
> Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc.
>
> On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" <tls-bounces@xxxxxxxx on behalf of daniel.migault@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi Simon,
>
> Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments in our version 04. Please see my comments inline.
>
> Yours,
> Daniel
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Simon Friedberger
> Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM
> To: ietf@xxxxxxxx
> Cc: tls@xxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard
>
> Nits:
>
> RFC 4279 reference is missing.
> MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in the Normative reference as well as in the introduction at line 127, in section 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know.
>
>
>
> "TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and above" or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
> MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
>
>> On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote:
>> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
>> (tls) to consider the following document:
>> - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
>> Security (TLS)'
>> <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
>>
>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>> ietf@xxxxxxxx mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments may
>> be sent to iesg@xxxxxxxx instead. In either case, please retain the
>> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>>
>> This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
>> Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on
>> the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
>> (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
>> with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK
>> provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
>> forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
>> integrity protection.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The file can be obtained via
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae ad/
>>
>> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae ad/ballot/
>>
>>
>> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>> TLS@xxxxxxxx
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
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