One small nit.
> ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy
I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just “forward secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach?
Tim
—
Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc.
On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" <tls-bounces@xxxxxxxx on behalf of daniel.migault@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hi Simon,
Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments in our version 04. Please see my comments inline.
Yours,
Daniel
-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Simon Friedberger
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM
To: ietf@xxxxxxxx
Cc: tls@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard
Nits:
RFC 4279 reference is missing.
MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in the Normative reference as well as in the introduction at line 127, in section 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know.
"TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and above" or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote:
> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
> (tls) to consider the following document:
> - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
> Security (TLS)'
> <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> ietf@xxxxxxxx mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments may
> be sent to iesg@xxxxxxxx instead. In either case, please retain the
> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>
> Abstract
>
>
> This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
> Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on
> the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
> (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
> with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK
> provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
> forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
> integrity protection.
>
>
>
>
> The file can be obtained via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
>
> IESG discussion can be tracked via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/
>
>
> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@xxxxxxxx
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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