RE: Genart last call review of draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04

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Hi Les, Robert and Alvaro,

Thanks for Les' proposed text. I'll update it accordingly.

B.R.
Bing


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert Sparks [mailto:rjsparks@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 1:36 AM
> To: Alvaro Retana (aretana); Les Ginsberg (ginsberg); Liubing (Leo);
> gen-art@xxxxxxxx
> Cc: draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf.all@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; isis-wg@xxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Genart last call review of draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04
> 
> +1
> 
> 
> On 4/10/17 1:32 PM, Alvaro Retana (aretana) wrote:
> > Works for me!
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> > Alvaro.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 4/10/17, 10:34 AM, "Les Ginsberg (ginsberg)" <ginsberg@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> >
> > Bing/Robert/Alvaro -
> >
> > Here is the existing text of the Security Section:
> >
> >    "In general, the use of authentication is incompatible with auto-
> >     configuration as it requires some manual configuration.
> >
> >     For wired deployment, the wired connection itself could be
> considered
> >     as an implicit authentication in that unwanted routers are usually
> >     not able to connect (i.e. there is some kind of physical security in
> >     place preventing the connection of rogue devices); for wireless
> >     deployment, the authentication could be achieved at the lower
> >     wireless link layer."
> >
> >
> > Proposed revision:
> >
> > "In the absence of cryptographic authentication it is possible for an
> > attacker to inject  a PDU falsely indicating there is a duplicate
> > system-id. This may trigger automatic restart of the protocol using the
> duplicate-id resolution procedures defined in this document.
> >
> > Note that the use of authentication is incompatible with auto-
> > configuration as it requires some manual configuration.
> >
> >     For wired deployment, the wired connection itself could be
> considered
> >     as an implicit authentication in that unwanted routers are usually
> >     not able to connect (i.e. there is some kind of physical security in
> >     place preventing the connection of rogue devices); for wireless
> >     deployment, the authentication could be achieved at the lower
> >     wireless link layer."
> >
> > ???
> >
> >
> >
> >





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