On 2016-06-29 14:30, Nick Hilliard wrote:
Job Snijders wrote:
I believe this update addresses the concerns raised in this phase of
the
document.
yes, thanks, it addresses these concerns, and the document is a lot
better as a result.
The second major area of concern I have about this proposal is the
transitive nature of the bgp community. The issue is that the draft
specifies a mechanism to cause traffic to be dropped on the floor, that
the signaling mechanism is globally transitive in scope, and the
specific intent is that prefixes tagged in this way are exported to
other ASNs. In other words, the draft specifies behaviour that is risky
by default.
Prefix hijacking rates suggest that adding a new compromise vector is
something that should be considered carefully in the context of
standardisation.
Nick (and all the others that have already discussed the topic in the
later posts),
I can't see why blackholing someone else's traffic can be more
dangerous/undesirable than sending it to the hijackers.
I think that chapter #5 addresses the issue as it should.
Also i think that there could be corner cases in which a the receiving
network may not want to add NO_EXPORT (there is at least one large
network that is using a different ASN for each region in which it
operates).
So forcing NO_EXPORT is not advisable.
Regards
--
Marco