On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 10:46:12AM -0600, Nico Williams wrote: > I would much prefer a Standards-Track document that says to > authenticate the origin domainname as follows: > > - use DNSSEC for all DNS queries needed to find the URI RRs and DANE > to authenticate the authorities of the resulting URIs > > or > > - expect the target authorities to have certificates that > authenticate the origin, using SNI if need be. > > I would still drop everything related to NAPTR and DDDS. That works for me, and is in reasonable alignment with draft-ietf-dane-srv which ignoring the gory details says essentially the same thing, but with the choice made dynamically, based on presence of "secure" SRV and TLSA RRsets, rather than as a static prior dichotomy. I am also fine with the informational variant. Either way, perhaps an informational reference to the DANE SRV draft would be helpful. As an instigator of the security sub-discussion, I just wanted to make sure than the document did not claim that introducing indirection into HTTPS has minor security consequences. Rather it is a significant change in the threat analysis for any application that makes the switch. Likely there are existing applications that have glossed over this issue (going through the motions) with MX and SRV records, but any such poor practices are not IMHO sufficient grounds to say that the current text's security considerations match the scope of the proposed semantics. And I still support the proposed semantics, just with eyes wide open to the security implications. -- Viktor.