RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?

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> This assumes that the telecom carriers and/or the suppliers of the
> carrier grade equipment would cooperate with the nation-states in
> question.  That could happen, certainly, but it becomes much more
> difficult to do this surreptitiously.

It is also fairly easy for OS conscious applications to use channel binding schemes and detect the MITM. At that point, the spies have to move from covert monitoring to overt surveillance, which should have some noticeable political consequences.

-- Christian Huitema







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