This document says RTP does not need to specify a security mechanisms and that's OK. Note this document could says you must do A or B depending on the situation but it does not. It just says it is ok not to specify anything. My read of the consensus at last plenary was that the IETF had decided it was going to stop doing that. I don't care about if this draft is published as it or not as I think this draft will have zero impact to what is deployed. I do think it is worth us being consistent on what security we expect to have in RFC going forward. All I am asking is the IESG be consistent about how they judge consensus on this and if they decide to publish it, provide some guidance on when they think it is fine to not have security and when they think it is not fine. On Dec 6, 2013, at 4:40 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Cullen, > > On 5 Dec 2013, at 16:56, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think this document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working group, I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either. >> >> I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each different scenario RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how it needs to be secured and for scenarios not listed such as new usages, what the requirements are. For something like SIP, having just one way to secure RTP is much better than having many ways. > > > I'm confused about your objection, since this draft states that we need to do exactly as you propose. > > Colin > > > > -- > Colin Perkins > http://csperkins.org/ > > >