Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> (1) I'm not trying to impugn the good work that was done in securing
> the root key. It was good work, and I think it was very cool. I am
> just asking if, despite that good work, an NSL could get around it.
> It's a fair question. The answer may be "no," or "not without it
> becoming public," or "with great difficulty." I doubt it's "easily."
> But it's worth asking. When you did the root signing, we were
> certainly thinking about this threat model, but it was a bit more
> academic then than it is now. I think we still had some illusions that
> the U.S. government at least would choose a more constrained attack
> than taking the key to everything; we now know that the government
> feels no such burden of restraint—they apparently feel that they can be
> trusted with that key, and we should be willing to provide it.
Based upon my reading of:
http://www.root-dnssec.org/tcr/selection-2010/
and my understanding from careful reading of the site that any three Crypto
Officers are enough to reconstruct the key, it seems that a US NSL would not
suffice.
There are not three US people in any category, but I did not read how the key
was split. If two Crypto Officers and a backup crypto officer cound as
three, then I'm wrong: a US NSL takes it.
I was also assuming that CO's for east coast do not also have west coast
keys, but I may be wrong here.
I don't know if the EU has an NSL process, but it seems that the EU could
also recover the keys if it wanted to.
--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Sandelman Software Works
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