On Nov 25, 2013, at 10:06 AM, John Levine <johnl@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> Is the DNSSEC root key secure against National Security Letters? >> What does that mean? Exactly what threat are you imagining an NSL would be used to hide? > Hijack someone's DNS traffic, provide a chain of fake servers pointing > to a fake mail or web host, all with valid DNSSEC. As I'm sure you're aware, for this attack to work, not only would the US government need to compromise the root KSK HSMs and a rather Byzantine set of safeguards, they would also presumably need to do so in a way that would reduce the likelihood that the compromised elements would be noticed. Since the data is public, this might be a bit tricky -- forcing the attack to occur as close to the target as possible to minimize the chances some non-target would notice (which, if it were noticed, would like result in the absolute worst possible case in DNSSEC-land, the need to do an emergency role of the root KSK in every resolver on the planet: something we still don't know how to do). Since the attack would already be down near the validating resolver, I suspect it would be _far_ easier and infinitely less risky to compromise that validating resolver (particularly if that resolver is operated by a third party, like it is for the vast majority of folks -- something I've long felt is fundamentally broken). > I guess that we need to ask the same question about TLDs that are > hosted in the United States. I would be surprised if only the US has NSLs. > That would mostly mean Verisign, Afilias and PIR, and Neustar. ICANN went to significant lengths to make everything done with the KSK extremely well documented and as public as humanly possible. I personally don't know what those organizations do (mostly because I haven't looked) but would be surprised if the level of disclosure is close to what ICANN has done. As such I feel Joe's response to Ted: >>>> Sounds like a good question to ask ICANN. was wrong. Professional Operational Security folk should review the root KSK DPS (https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt) and identify any weaknesses, including any vulnerabilities to NSL-like attacks so those weaknesses can be remedied. Simply waving "NSL" around like a magic wand is unhelpful. Regards, -drc
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