RE: Transport Directorate review of: draft-ietf-l2vpn-vpls-mcast-14

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Yakov,

> How about if I'll add the following at the end of 5.5:
> 
>   Aggregation procedures would require two labels stack.
>   This does not introduce any new implications on MTU,
>   as even VPLS multicast supported by ingress
>   replication requires two labels stack.

Sure, minor suggestion - "two labels stack" -> "two MPLS labels in the label stack" (twice).

> > I'd suggest an initial sentence:
> >
> > 	Replication of traffic within a multicast tree, and flooding
> > 	of traffic (see section 14) could be employed as traffic
> > 	amplifiers in denial of service attacks.
> 
> I'll add this.

Ok, but see below for a combined text suggestion that includes ...

> > Followed by a sentence or sentences that list a few important applicable
> > countermeasures (your choice), explaining why each is applicable and
> > indicating where each is described (this document, RFC 4761 or RFC 4762).
> 
> I would greatly appreciated if you would help me with "a sentence
> or sentences" to cover this. I don't think RFC4761 or RFC4762
> describe any of such countermeasures.

The security considerations section already contains this sentence:

   As mentioned in [RFC4761], there are two aspects to achieving data
   privacy and protect against denial-of-service attacks in a VPLS:
   securing the control plane and protecting the forwarding path.

The rest of that paragraph covers data privacy and black-holing.  Perhaps
just extend the last sentence, e.g.,:

OLD
   In addition, compromise of the control plane could result in black-
   holing VPLS multicast data.
NEW
   In addition, compromise of the control plane could result in black-
   holing VPLS multicast data and could provide opportunities for
   unauthorized VPLS multicast usage (e.g., exploiting traffic
   replication within a multicast tree to amplify a denial of
   service attack based on sending large amounts of traffic).

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Yakov Rekhter [mailto:yakov@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 8:13 PM
> To: Black, David
> Cc: Yakov Rekhter; tsv-dir@xxxxxxxx; raggarwa_1@xxxxxxxxx; y.kamite@xxxxxxx;
> lufang@xxxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; l2vpn@xxxxxxxx; stbryant@xxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Transport Directorate review of: draft-ietf-l2vpn-vpls-mcast-14
> 
> David,
> 
> > Yakov,
> >
> > First of all, thank you for overlooking the "off-by-one" error on
> > the year :-) -
> >
> > > > Review Date: September 23, 2012
> > > > IETF LC End Date: September 23, 2012
> >
> > Of course, 2013 was intended, twice ;-).
> 
> :-)
> 
> > On the two items (both are editorial, IMHO):
> >
> > > > (1) The techniques in this draft appear to add an MPLS label to the
> > > > stack in order to identify the MPLS multicast tree.  Does that added
> > > > label raise any MTU concerns in practice?
> > >
> > > No more than any other use of label stacking (and there are plenty
> > > of other uses of label stacking).
> >
> > I concur, which is why I noted this item as editorial - I don't think
> > it's an actual issue.
> >
> > > Furthermore, rfc3032 ("MPLS Label
> > > Stack Encoding") does cover the MTU issue.
> >
> > A sentence to that effect (lots of uses of label stacking, MTU effects
> > are both well understood and not a problem in practice) with a
> > reference to RFC 3032 should suffice.
> 
> How about if I'll add the following at the end of 5.5:
> 
>   Aggregation procedures would require two labels stack.
>   This does not introduce any new implications on MTU,
>   as even VPLS multicast supported by ingress
>   replication requires two labels stack.
> 
> > > > (2) Two techniques used by this draft - replication of traffic within
> > > > a multicast tree, and flooding of traffic (section 14) - could be
> > > > employed as traffic amplifiers in denial of service attacks.  A short
> > > > discussion of this possibility and the applicability of countermeasures
> > > > described in this draft, RFC 4761 and/or RFC 4762 would be good to
> > > > add to the security considerations section.
> > >
> > > The Security Consideration section already talks about 4761 and 4762:
> > >
> > >    Security considerations discussed in [RFC4761] and [RFC4762] apply to
> > >    this document.
> > >
> > > Suggestion on any additional text would be greatly appreciated.
> >
> > I'd suggest an initial sentence:
> >
> > 	Replication of traffic within a multicast tree, and flooding
> > 	of traffic (see section 14) could be employed as traffic
> > 	amplifiers in denial of service attacks.
> 
> I'll add this.
> 
> > Followed by a sentence or sentences that list a few important applicable
> > countermeasures (your choice), explaining why each is applicable and
> > indicating where each is described (this document, RFC 4761 or RFC 4762).
> 
> I would greately appreciated if you would help me with "a sentence
> or sentences" to cover this. I don't think RFC4761 or RFC4762
> describe any of such countermeasures.
> 
> Yakov.
> 
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Yakov Rekhter [mailto:yakov@xxxxxxxxxxx]
> > > Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 10:27 AM
> > > To: Black, David
> > > Cc: tsv-dir@xxxxxxxx; raggarwa_1@xxxxxxxxx; y.kamite@xxxxxxx;
> > > lufang@xxxxxxxxx; yakov@xxxxxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; l2vpn@xxxxxxxx;
> > > stbryant@xxxxxxxxx; yakov@xxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Subject: Re: Transport Directorate review of: draft-ietf-l2vpn-vpls-mcast-
> 1
> 4
> > >
> > > David,
> > >
> > > > I've reviewed this document as part of the transport area directorate's
> > > > ongoing effort to review key IETF documents. These comments were written
> > > > primarily for the transport area directors, but are copied to the
> > > > document's authors for their information and to allow them to address
> > > > any issues raised. When done at the time of IETF Last Call, the authors
> > > > should consider this review together with any other last-call comments
> > > > they receive. Please always CC ​tsv-dir@xxxxxxxx if you reply to or
> > > > forward this review.
> > >
> > > Thanks for your review.
> > >
> > > > Document: draft-ietf-l2vpn-vpls-mcast-14
> > > > Reviewer: David L. Black
> > > > Review Date: September 23, 2012
> > > > IETF LC End Date: September 23, 2012
> > > >
> > > > Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits
> that
> > > > 	should be fixed before publication.
> > > >
> > > > This draft describes multicast optimizations for VPLS via use of MPLS
> > > > multicast distribution trees within the service provider (SP) network.
> > > >
> > > > In general, the techniques in this draft are an improvement, as they
> > > > should typically result in reduction of SP network traffic required
> > > > to carry the same level of multicast traffic originating from the VPLS
> > > > edges.  I have reviewed primarily for transport-related topics; while
> > > > I don't have the expertise to review for MPLS and VPLS concerns, I'm
> > > > confident in the expertise of this author team in those technologies.
> > > >
> > > > I found a couple of items that are effectively editorial:
> > > >
> > > > (1) The techniques in this draft appear to add an MPLS label to the
> > > > stack in order to identify the MPLS multicast tree.  Does that added
> > > > label raise any MTU concerns in practice?
> > >
> > > No more than any other use of label stacking (and there are plenty
> > > of other uses of label stacking). Furthermore, rfc3032 ("MPLS Label
> > > Stack Encoding") does cover the MTU issue.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > (2) Two techniques used by this draft - replication of traffic within
> > > > a multicast tree, and flooding of traffic (section 14) - could be
> > > > employed as traffic amplifiers in denial of service attacks.  A short
> > > > discussion of this possibility and the applicability of countermeasures
> > > > described in this draft, RFC 4761 and/or RFC 4762 would be good to
> > > > add to the security considerations section.
> > >
> > > The Security Consideration section already talks about 4761 and 4762:
> > >
> > >    Security considerations discussed in [RFC4761] and [RFC4762] apply to
> > >    this document.
> > >
> > > Suggestion on any additional text would be greatly appreciated.
> > >
> > > Yakov.
> > >
> > > > ----------------------------------------------------
> > > > David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
> > > > EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
> > > > +1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
> > > > david.black@xxxxxxx        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> > > > ----------------------------------------------------
> > > >
> > > >
> >
> >






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