Re: Transparency in Specifications and PRISM-class attacks

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At 06:12 20-09-2013, Harald Alvestrand wrote:
By those who implement them, and those who try to understand how it works to the degree that they feel assured that there are no non-understood security risks (intentional or otherwise).

Yes.

From the stack I'm currently working on, I find the ICE spec to be convoluted, but the SDP spec is worse, becaue it's spread across so many documents, and there are pieces where people seem to have agreed to ship documents rather than agree on what they meant.
I have not found security implications of these issues.

I'll quote a message [1] from an ex-IAB member:

  "in IPv4 days:
    - implement and test
    - then write a draft
   or,
    - BSD IPv4 code is there
    - everyone cheated and looked at it
   today:
    - write a draft with pipe dream
    - spam IESG
    - then implement
    - big issue happen
    - go back to 1"

It is an implementor's nightmare to understand a specification when it is spread across multiple documents. The "Updates" and document status (label) does not make matters easier. Some parts will not be committed into the tree as it is not simply a matter of writing code; there is also the question of who is going to maintain that code.

At 07:34 20-09-2013, John C Klensin wrote:
I don't know of any general solution to those problems, but I
think the community and the IESG have got to be a lot more
willing to push back on a spec because it is incomprehensible or
contains too many options than has been the case in recent years.

If I recall correctly there was a discussion about a solution in 1992. RFC 2026 also considered the problem of too many options and offered a path to resolve that.

At 08:37 19-09-2013, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Whatever our personal political views on the matter are, the views of our audience are likely to be different. Most of our audience are not US citizens, they are not even from the Anglosphere.

Yes.

of the one CA. That is OK, I don't complaint about that, I have always understood that anyone who is taking on a position of extreme responsibility is subject to an equally extreme degree of proof.

Yes.

The process I have seen instead is that people argue about whether a requirement should be included in the requirements document and the final requirements document is a list of requirements the noisiest people in the group thought were important rather than what the document should be which is a tool to determine whether the design is capable of addressing the use cases.

The boundary between use cases and edge cases is not always clear. The requirements document is a long list of stuff to satisfy the noisiest and the people considered as important. Harald Alvestrand mentioned "actually finishing our specs". It's difficult to get there when a working group suffers from exhaustion.

Regards,
-sm

1. http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipv6/current/msg07313.html




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