Re: Transparency in Specifications and PRISM-class attacks

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I'd like to snippet Phil's suggestion to an abbreviated version of one sentence, becaue I think this is right on.

On 09/19/2013 05:37 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
The issue we need to focus on is how to convince our audience that our specifications have not been compromised

To my mind, the first thing to focus on is making our specs readable, so that it's possible to understand that they have not been compromised.

That means that complexity is our enemy.

(Or perhaps the zeroeth thing is actually finishing our specs, so that we can worry about whether RFC XXXX is compromised rather than worrying about whether deployed equipment has fixed the glitch that was introduced in -24 and fixed in -27, but everyone had forgotten about by -33...)




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