Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-spfbis-4408bis-19.txt> (Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1) to Proposed Standard

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On Aug 26, 2013, at 4:29 PM, Scott Kitterman <scott@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Monday, August 26, 2013 16:28:03 Douglas Otis wrote:
>> On Aug 26, 2013, at 3:48 PM, Scott Kitterman <scott@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Monday, August 26, 2013 15:42:41 Douglas Otis wrote:
>>>> Please also note that the PTR RR is not constrained in the current
>>>> specification and can create erratic results.  It would be far safer to
>>>> Perm error when overflowing on the number of PTR records.  There is no
>>>> upper limit as some represent web farms hosting thousands of domains.
>>> 
>>> This exact issue was the subject of working group discussion.  Since the
>>> number of PTR records is an attribute of the connect IP, it is under the
>>> control of the sending party, not the domain owner.  A cap that resulted
>>> in an error would, as a result, enable the sender to arbitrarily get an
>>> SPF permerror in place of a fail if desired.  The WG considered that not
>>> a good idea.
>> 
>> Dear Scott,
>> 
>> It is within the control of the Domain owner about whether to make use of
>> the ptr mechanism in their SPF TXT.  Random ordering or responses is also
>> controlled by the IP address owner and not the Domain owner.  The ptr
>> mechanism may offer intermittent results that will be difficult to
>> troubleshoot.  By offering a Perm error on a ptr overflow, the domain owner
>> is quickly notified this mechanism should not be used and are not fooled by
>> it working some of the time.  The greater concern is in regard to the over
>> all response sizes when DNSSEC is used.  In that case, response sizes can
>> grow significantly.  Allowing large responses to occur without producing an
>> error seems like a risky strategy from the DDoS perspective.  That is also
>> another reason for worrying about the use of TXT RRs.  How many large
>> wildcard TXT RR exist, and if they do, who would be at fault when this
>> becomes a problem for SPF?
> 
> Your conclusion is different than the one the working group reached.

Dear Scott, 

Do you recall whether DNSSEC had been considered?

Regards,
Douglas Otis




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