>> Once process by the server, a protocol that provides authentication and integrity protection is used between the server and router. From the Table of Contents, the choices are clear: >> 7.1. SSH Transport >> 7.2. TLS Transport >> 7.3. TCP MD5 Transport >> 7.4. TCP-AO Transport >> >> I would personally prefer that the TCP MD5 choice not be used, but the model is clear. >> >> This approach lets the server handle that certificate path construction, signature checking, and revocation checking. It seems desirable to offload these potentially expensive operations, while preserving the integrity of the subset of the information actually needed by the router. > > Right, so precisely back to my original concern: > > "Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport > over TCP using a port, rpki-rtr, to be assigned, see Section 12. > Operators SHOULD use procedural means, ACLs, ... to reduce > the exposure to authentication issues." Maybe I misunderstood your concern. The operator's server to the operator's routers only involves the operator's internal network. While I would personally prefer a mandatory-to-implement mechanism, I can see that operators do not necessarily want prescriptive statements on this part of the specification. Russ _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf