Hi Richard, I think we're close: > Confidentiality and integrity protections SHOULD be used when policy URIs are conveyed in a location > configuration protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy > resource. Note that in some protocols (such as DHCP), these protections may arise from limiting the > use of the protocol to the local network, thus relying on lower-layer security mechanisms. When > neither application-layer or network-layer security is provided, location servers MUST reject requests > using the PUT and DELETE methods, and SHOULD reject PUT and DELETE requests for policy URIs that use > the "http:" URI scheme. This text looks good to me, except that the structure of the final sentence inadvertently neuters the final "SHOULD" requirement. Can we move that requirement into Section 7.1? The change in Section 7.2 would then be: OLD: " Confidentiality is required for its conveyance in the location configuration protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy resource. " NEW: " Confidentiality and integrity protections SHOULD be used when policy URIs are conveyed in a location configuration protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy resource. Note that in some protocols (such as DHCP), these protections may arise from limiting the use of the protocol to the local network, thus relying on lower-layer security mechanisms. When neither application-layer or network-layer security is provided, location servers MUST reject requests using the PUT and DELETE methods. " This change in Section 7.1 would pick up the moved requirement: OLD If other means of protection are available, an "http:" URI MAY be used. NEW If other means of protection are available, an "http:" URI MAY be used, but location servers SHOULD reject all PUT and DELETE requests for policy URIs that use the "http:" URI scheme. END One of my concerns behind wanting this general "SHOULD" is that there's no assurance that an "http:" URI will stay confined to the local network that is being relied upon to secure it. Thanks, --David > -----Original Message----- > From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rbarnes@xxxxxxx] > Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2011 9:43 PM > To: Black, David > Cc: martin.thomson@xxxxxxxxxx; james.winterbottom@xxxxxxxxxx; Hannes.Tschofenig@xxxxxxx; gen- > art@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; rjsparks@xxxxxxxxxxx; geopriv@xxxxxxxx > Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-uri-02 > > Hi David, > > The penalty for getting a quick response for the first time is that the second response takes longer > :) Inline. > > > - The additional text in section 3.1 stating that the policy URI is a shared > > secret with a forward reference to the security considerations section > > removes the surprise factor. > > - The additional text on URI unpredictability in section 7.2 recommending a > > combination of 32 bits of entropy with rate limiting provides concrete > > guidance to implementers. > > Thanks, we'll note those changes for the RFC editor (or for a new revision, if our AD prefers). > > > > That leaves the issue of confidentiality and integrity requirements in section 7.2: > > > >>> Alternatively, changing "required" to "REQUIRED" in the following sentence > >>> in Section 7.2 may suffice, although integrity is not mentioned in this > >>> sentence: > >>> > >>> Confidentiality is required for its conveyance in the > >>> location configuration protocol, and in the requests that are used > >>> to inspect, change or delete the policy resource. > >> > >> I like this phrasing. I'm not sure it's quite REQUIRED (following the "MUST implement / MAY use" > >> pattern of BCP 61), but I would go for a strong SHOULD. The underlying LCP protocols already > >> guarantee the "MUST implement". Suggested text: > >> > >> Section 7.2 > >> OLD: > >> " > >> Confidentiality is required for its conveyance in the location configuration protocol, and in the > >> requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy resource. > >> " > >> NEW: > >> " > >> Confidentiality and integrity protections SHOULD be used when policy URIs are conveyed in a > location > >> configuration protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy > >> resource. > >> " > > > > The reason for going beyond BCP 61 is that BCP 61 concerns protocols in general, but this > > is a specific case with additional security requirements because a policy URI is a shared > > secret. If a policy URI is sent without confidentiality, a likely result is that the > > policy URI is still shared, but is no longer sufficiently secret (oops). > > > > This is particularly dangerous if there are no additional authorization checks on the > > PUT or DELETE methods for the policy URI, but it's probably ok in some situations if only > > the GET method is allowed (e.g., policy creation and update are handled via some other means > > such as a secure web portal). > > > > For that reason, the proposed SHOULD requirement would be ok with me if a couple of things > > were added: > > (i) If an LCP sends a policy URI without confidentiality protection, then the > > LIS or LS MUST reject the PUT and DELETE methods for that URI. > > (ii) The PUT and DELETE methods SHOULD NOT be supported for policy URIs that > > use the "http:" URI scheme (in contrast to the "https:" URI scheme). > > > > For (i) it'd also be useful to note that the current LCPs never send a policy URI > > without confidentiality protection in connection with this (already stated in 7.1, > > but ought to be connected to (i) if that text winds up in a different section). > > > > For (ii), I'm not sure what is envisioned by the final sentence in section 7.1: > > > > If other means of protection are available, an "http:" URI MAY be used. > > > > What sorts of "other means of protection" were the underlying motivation? Those "other > > means of protection" would be the reason for (ii) being a "SHOULD" instead of a "MUST". > > I think the general countervailing idea here is that location servers are generally expected to be a > local network function (see, for example, RFC 5986). In this context, you benefit some from "other > protection" in that in order to capture information, an attacker has to be fairly close to the victim. > > There's a strong tie to DHCP security here. On one level, by analogy; DHCP, after all, provides no > confidentiality protection, which is acceptable largely because its use is so constrained. At another > level, though, we have to keep in mind that one of the goals of this document is to enable policy > URIs to be distributed through DHCP. So even if we place stronger controls on policy URIs, DHCP will > still be a "weaker link". Or, said the other way around, if we require stronger controls for policy > URIs (as in your text), then we might as well remove the DHCP transport from the document. > > Nonetheless, your two caveats look fine to me if we make some accommodation for this constrained case. > Proposed text: > > OLD: > " > Confidentiality is required for its conveyance in the location configuration protocol, and in the > requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy resource. > " > NEW: > " > Confidentiality and integrity protections SHOULD be used when policy URIs are conveyed in a location > configuration protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy > resource. Note that in some protocols (such as DHCP), these protections may arise from limiting the > use of the protocol to the local network, thus relying on lower-layer security mechanisms. When > neither application-layer or network-layer security is provided, location servers MUST reject requests > using the PUT and DELETE methods, and SHOULD reject PUT and DELETE requests for policy URIs that use > the "http:" URI scheme. > " > > Thanks, > --Richard > > > _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf