On 8/27/2011 4:12 PM, t.petch wrote: > Glen > > Me again. > > Just after I posted my last message, I received a post on the ietf-ssh list, > hosted by netbsd.org, and looking through the 'Received: from' headers, as one > does on a wet Saturday morning of a Bank Holiday weekend, there was TLS, used to > submit the message to the server, so even spammers have caught on that TLS > should be used everywhere. End to end? Apparently, from the POV of the spammer & his SMTP server. Email is a store & forward system. In any case, my original question was not about the definition of end-to-end, it was about Ned usage of the term "hop". Upon further analysis, however, it seems clear that he was referring to the email archives as if they are something other than simple files (as betrayed by his statement that "Don't pretend a transfer protection mechanism covering exactly one hop provides real object security, because it doesn't."); thus, the retrieval of the archived data would be the last "hop" in the email system. There seem to be two problems with this statement: one is taking the file transfer mechanism as if it was part of the email system itself, which it obviously is not (downloading an archived message is no different than downloading an RFC from a Web site); the other being that someone, somewhere was pretending that TLS does something that it was never designed to do (a straw man of, AFAICT, Ned's invention -- I don't recall anybody making such a claim on this thread, nor for that matter saying they _wanted_ "real object security" applied to the archives, merely that it's not really a bad idea for a person retrieving them to have some assurance that they came from the IETF server and that they weren't modified in transit). ... _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf