Re: existing (and questionable) application designs [was Re: US DoD and IPv6]

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Brian is playing unfair here by introducing an actual application layer consequence into the architecture discussion :-)


The referral problem he refers to is real, but I see it more as a consequence of the IETF being too rigid in its approach to address numbering.

The basic question here is that we have two hosts that are to connect for a peer-peer protocol in which either endpoint can initiate or respond to a connection request.


Clearly this is rather challenging if the boundaries between addressing schemes are arbitrary and becomes somewhat simpler in a uniform addressing model.

But the real Internet is not like that. It is a network of networks and crossing the boundary between a private network and the interconnect space between the networks has consequences.

One of those consequences is that addresses can change at the private/interconnect border. Another consequence is that crossing that boundary should have security consequences.


Opening up a port to receive connection requests has considerably greater security consequence than making the request. The requester is opening a communication channel with a single, specified entity, the responder is opening access to any host on the Internet.

"It is much better to give than to receive"

So opening a port is an event that should be mediated by access control at the host level and private/interconnect border at a minimum. In a default deny network there will be additional policy enforcement within the private network. 
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