Re: mini-cores (was Re: ULA-C)

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Paul Vixie wrote:
>> Mumble.  It's hard for me to buy the idea of there not being a "core"
>> portion of the Internet from which all public addresses are reachable. 
>>     
>
> i was going to say, "but these addresses aren't public", but then i saw the
> larger problem, which is that the internet's architecture has guardians who
> are able to either buy into, or not, various ideas. 
"guardians" seems a bit skewed. within IETF, the RIRs, ICANN, USDoC,
Verisign,  Cisco, or Microsoft it might make sense to think of there
being guardians who can promote a bad technology or block a good one,
each within their particular sphere.  but I find it hard to think of the
LAN manager who buys a NAT box as being a guardian.  sure the vendors
hawked them and misrepresented them, but the consumers kept buying them,
because there wasn't a better way to get that functionality in IPv4. 
>  sometimes this is a
> good thing, as with the wildcard *.COM that pointed to a sitefinder service.
> other times this isn't a good thing, as occurred with NAT, firewalls, and
> application layer gateways.  how to tell good from bad?  i think it's 
> whether the guardians think the idea is a stupid waste of the proposer's
> time, or whether they think it will do outright harm.
>
> "harm" becomes the important term in that equation... is it harmful to let
> someone else's idea go forward because it will dilute the need for a better
> solution?  that's why a lot of people think DNSSEC DLV is bad -- simply that
> it would take pressure off signing the root zone.  is it harmful to set up
> a service that stops RCODE=3 responses from coming back when a nonexistent
> name ending in ".COM" is looked up?  that's what i said when verisign added
> a *.COM wildcard pointing to sitefinder.
>
> without a consensus on what it means "to harm", we're sort of stuck.  ULA-G
> (and therefore ULA-C) would allow consenting adults to exchange routes using
> the whois and in-addr infrastructure that has historically been reserved for
> "public networking".  lots of people, fearing leakage of "local" to "public",
> think there is too much latent harm in this kind of centralized locality.  in
> the IETF, the naysayers pretty much kick the consenting adults' asses every
> day and twice on sunday.  and that's the real problem here, i finally think.
>   
it certainly is a problem.  and yet failure to provide direction seems
to cause even more problems.

Keith


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