At Wed, 12 Sep 2007 11:27:07 -0400, Keith Moore wrote: > > > >> And I think looking at protocols without an understanding of how they > >> are used and how they interact with the UI is just as wrong as > >> attempting to fix the problem simply within the UI. You wrote that some > >> mechanisms could be made to work. You might be right, but I'm not > >> convinced. Someone actually has to write out how these mechanisms, such > >> as challenge/response ARE made to work with a web browser and a > >> transactional protocol, such that they also actually solve Eliot's Dad's > >> probem (EDP ;-) of the user not shooting themselves in the foot by > >> transmitting the same credential to multiple disparate relying parties > >> (or authenticating services, if you will). > >> > > > > None of the systems I mentioned (TLS-PSK, SRP, PwdHash) has this > > problem--provided that the user actually uses the new authentication > > method and doesn't type his password into some Web form. But of > > course that's a UI problem, not a protocol problem. > > > and IMHO, any solution that doesn't let the user type his password into > some Web form is a non-starter, > both for reasons of backward compatibility and because sites (quite > legitimately) want to provide a > visually attractive interface to users which is consistent across all > platforms (for support reasons). This may well be true. However, I'm not aware of any technique which both meets this constraint and is phishing resistant. -Ekr _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf