Dan Harkins wrote:
Sam,
But for things like HOKEY or 802.11r they want to have the AAA server
create a key hierarchy rooted off the EMSK or the MSK, respectively, that
contains keys for specific authenticators. These keys are going to be
distributed using AAA (that seems to be the plan) and either proactively
distributed-- "here have a key!"-- or distributed on demand-- "gimme a
key!" The authenticator-specific key gets produced by mixing in some
identity of the authenticator and that key is then sent under the
protection of the security association between the AAA server and the
authenticator.
Dan,
I snipped all the rest of the email so I can get a clarification from
you on this particular paragraph. The problem you describe here is that
the authenticator gets a key based on the claimed identity of the
authenticator. If the peer and the server do not have a way to verify
the identity of the authenticator it is a problem because the key that
the server sends to the authenticator is the same as long as the claimed
identity of the authenticator is the same.
Do I understand correctly?
thanks,
Lakshminath
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