> From: ietf-bounces@xxxxxxxx [mailto:ietf-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On > Behalf Of Tim Bray > On Sep 24, 2005, at 8:28 PM, Dean Anderson wrote: > > > None of my emails have been abusive. > > Speaking as a 99.99999999% passive observer around here, I consider > Dean Anderson's emails, in aggregate, abusive. They consume precious > mental bandwidth, in many cases with no material technical content, > and thus make it more difficult for me (and I assume many others) to > follow the flow of IETF discussion. I am completely unable to follow the line of argument. Dean appears to be claiming that DNSSEC is somehow incompatible with the widespread use of anycast. If for the sake of argument we accept this as true the only conclusion I could draw from such a situation is that DNSSEC would have to be sent back to be reworked again. If DNSSEC does not support existing use cases then it has to be fixed. But I do not see how DNSSEC is incompatible with anycast. It is merely an assertion that is repeated without evidence. Anycast might possibly break TCP/IP fallback but it is unlikely that the anycast routes would change rapidly enough for that effect to be any more significant than existing TCP issues created by firewalls. Cryptography is remarkably indifferent to transport, this is the biggest challenge in the DKIM spec. Depending on particular transport configurations has in the past turned out to be a mistake. The authentication of the end point IP addresses in IPSEC achieves no useful security purpose, it only causes the protocol to become more brittle in use. If the issue is real then it should be raised in DNSEXT where the DNSSEC specs are being developed. It does not appear to be genuine to me. _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf