IESG,
I would like to request that we consider Dean Anderson posting
privileges to be removed for the dnsop and ietf maillist.
As you can see from my private mail that Dean forwarded to the IETF
list, I have given him an official warning to refrain from sending any
more abusive mails to IETF maillists. Despite this, he immediately
followed up by sending more abusive mails to the dnsop and ietf
mail lists.
I hope that we can discuss this as soon as possible. Until then, I
will try to refrain from sending any more messages on this topic as I
don't believe that this will be productive. People on this mail list
might want to consider to do the same thing.
Thanks,
David Kessens
Operations & Management Area Director
---
----- Forwarded message from Dean Anderson <dean@xxxxxxx> -----
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2005 20:08:46 -0400 (EDT)
From: Dean Anderson <dean@xxxxxxx>
X-X-Sender: dean@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To: ietf@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Mismanagement of the DNSOP list
FYI: I am being threatened for posting operationally relevant criticism of
mis-operation of the F DNS Root server on the DNSOP list.
--
Av8 Internet Prepared to pay a premium for better service?
www.av8.net faster, more reliable, better service
617 344 9000
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2005 15:55:20 -0700
From: David Kessens <david.kessens@xxxxxxxxx>
To: Dean Anderson <dean@xxxxxxx>
Cc: David Meyer <dmm@xxxxxxxxx>, Rob Austein <sra@xxxxxxxxxx>,
Bert Wijnen <bwijnen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [david.kessens@xxxxxxxxx: Re: [dnsop] An attack that DNSSEC would
have defended against...]
Dean,
To avoid any misunderstandings: My message is an official warning to
you that I will propose to the IESG to remove your posting privileges
if I see one more abusive mail from you.
Thanks,
David Kessens
---
----- Forwarded message from David Kessens <david.kessens@xxxxxxxxx> -----
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2005 15:36:11 -0700
From: David Kessens <david.kessens@xxxxxxxxx>
To: Dean Anderson <dean@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <harald@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, dnsop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [dnsop] An attack that DNSSEC would have defended against...
Dean,
You are welcome to post to this list if you have DNS operational
issues to discuss.
Any issues that you might have with ISC are outside the charter of
this working group and I would like to request you to take them up
privately with ISC.
Thanks,
David Kessens
---
On Fri, Sep 23, 2005 at 06:09:23PM -0400, Dean Anderson wrote:
> Harald, you may be right about DNSSEC protecting from this. I haven't looked at
> your data, yet. However, you probably aren't about to be very well protected by
> DNSSEC, despite the progress of specifications on DNSEXT.
>
> DNSSEC isn't deployable on F-root nor the other anycast'ed* roots, nor a lot of
> other anycast'ed non-root servers. DNS servers with the Anycast Extension are
> increasingly popular due to suppression of discussion of negative aspects of the
> Anycast Extension on forums such as Nanog as recently as May, 2005 because only
> information that promotes ISC's view is allowed on Nanog, misleading network
> operators about the Anycast Extension. Many root server operators accepted
> ISC's assurances as an unofficial IETF liason and deployed Anycast Extension on
> production servers and on root servers in violation of RFC 2870**. They appear
> not to have understood that they were deploying an untested, undocumented, and
> unapproved Anycast Extension.
>
> And despite substantiated criticism on DNSEXT and DNSOP by persons including Dan
> Bernstein, Iljitsch van Beijnum, Dean Anderson, and others since the 2002 Nanog
> presentation by ISC, ISC has not yet even publicly acknowledged the problems
> with the Anycast Extension, and continues to promote the extension as completely
> safe. ISC even describes it to prospective customers as "uncontroversial",
> despite the controversies on DNSEXT, DNSOP, and Nanog beginning after the Nanog
> presentation in 2002.
>
> The Anycast Extension is now proposed to the GROW working group some 3 years
> after being described to Nanog as operationally safe and stable. At present,
> the Anycast Extension proposal appears to be dead or dying on both DNSOP and
> GROW WGs because of evidence that it can't work in general, and the specialized
> conditions where it can work are uninteresting to the current users such as root
> DNS operators and other DNS operators, and thus uninteresting to ISC.
>
> The only reason there are no present complaints with root operations is that DNS
> is mostly still stateless small UDP packets, reducing to RFC 1546 Anycast***,
> which works fine with stateless small UDP packets. And it may well be that those
> working on DNSSEC testing comply with the assumptions stated on the Anycast
> Extension.
>
> So the question is when will F-root and other roots be able to handle TCP and
> large UDP packets from any internet host, including those hosts serviced by
> networks that use fine-grained load-splitting as described by RFC1812?. When
> will operators be informed of these problems by ISC?
>
> Critics of these problems, particularly Dan Bernstein and Dean Anderson, have
> been attacked personally by persons generally associated with ISC or friendly to
> ISC with no remedial action by the respective organizations (IETF and Nanog) in
> spite of well-documented complaints. Uncontrolled personal corruption at the
> IETF and Nanog appears to be preventing actual progress.
>
> --Dean
>
> [* the Anycast Extension
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-grow-anycast-01.txt doesn't work
> in general because routers are allowed by RFC1812 to do fine-grained "load
> splitting" if they wish. Fine-grained load splitting, also known as Per Packet
> Load Balancing (PPLB) and other names, prevents Anycast from being used with TCP
> or large UDP packets and fragments. The draft documents a number of assumptions
> that have to be true in order for the Anycast Extension to work. These
> assumptions aren't true in general.]
>
> [** RFC 2870 section 2.6 specifies that Root DNS server operators must operate
> servers that respond to _any_ Internet host. That is, Root nameservers that
> only work for say, 95% of the world are not acceptable.
>
> 2.6 Root servers MUST answer queries from any internet host, i.e. may
> not block root name resolution from any valid IP address, except
> in the case of queries causing operational problems, in which
> case the blocking SHOULD last only as long as the problem, and be
> as specific as reasonably possible.
> ]
>
> [*** RFC1546 notes that:
>
> It is important to remember that anycasting is a stateless service.
> An internetwork has no obligation to deliver two successive packets
> sent to the same anycast address to the same host.
> ]
>
>
> On Fri, 23 Sep 2005, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:
>
> > I'm not sure this is on-topic for this list, but may be an illustrative
> > story....
> >
> > I had some percentage of the queries for a domain I use hijacked by an
> > attacker last week. The technique involved was interesting to me.
> >
> > Moral: Know your secondaries, and what happens to them..... if someone
> > steals your secondary's NAME, you're toast.
> >
> > If I'd had DNSSEC, and the people looking it up had had DNSSEC, this would
> > have been a detectable DOS attack, not a stealth redirection attack.
> >
> > Detailed writeup: http://www.alvestrand.no/subjects/dns-attack-1.html
> >
> > Harald
> >
> >
> > .
> > dnsop resources:_____________________________________________________
> > web user interface: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop.html
> > mhonarc archive: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop/index.html
> >
> >
>
> --
> Av8 Internet Prepared to pay a premium for better service?
> www.av8.net faster, more reliable, better service
> 617 344 9000
>
>
>
>
>
>
> .
> dnsop resources:_____________________________________________________
> web user interface: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop.html
> mhonarc archive: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~llynch/dnsop/index.html
_______________________________________________
Ietf@xxxxxxxx
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf