Avri, the way I read Leslies text is that the IAD and IAOC darn better respond to normal queries and questions and that they also document the questions and answers in a public place. If they just frivorously ignore such questions, then it is clear that thye (IAD and IAOC) are NOT doing their job. And if anyone experiences such a thing, then they can raise it to public lists and I am sure we'll get enough community pressure to do something about it as a community (one way or another). just my 2 cents Bert > -----Original Message----- > From: ietf-bounces@xxxxxxxx [mailto:ietf-bounces@xxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of > avri@xxxxxxx > Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 14:03 > To: Harald Tveit Alvestrand > Cc: ietf@xxxxxxxx > Subject: Re: Mud. Clear as. Re: Rough consensus? #425 3.5 > > > Hi Harald, > > On 26 jan 2005, at 02.23, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote: > > > Avri, > > > > --On tirsdag, januar 25, 2005 23:44:09 -0500 avri@xxxxxxx wrote: > > > >> Hi Leslie, > >> > >> This formulation is still of the form that does not give the IETF > >> community a direct voice in the review and appeal > mechanisms for the > >> IAOC. > > > > I do not understand what you mean by "direct voice". Could > you explain? > > As I understand Leslie's formulation, the IAOC has no requirement to > process a review from a normal member of the IETF Community > unless that > request comes from the IAB or IESG. To my mind, this means that the > IAOC is answerable to the IAB or IESG and not directly answerable to > the IETF Community. > > When an individual IETF participant makes a review request, it may be > ignored. > If someone is unhappy at being ignored they may make a request to the > IAB or IESG for recognition. This request may be also ignored, with > the only recourse to that being an appeal of the IAB or IESG decision > to ignore their request. > > That is, it is only if someone interests the IAB or IESG in > their issue > that it forces a review. Also the only decision that can really be > appealed is the IAB or IESG handling of the request for a review not > the decision of the IAOC. I am defining that this as not > having direct > voice. > > > > > > If what you mean is that the community should have representatives > > involved in the consideration of the issues, and do not > think that the > > nomcom-selected members, the IESG-selected members and the > > IAB-selected members of the IAOC are appropriate community > > representation, I do not see any mechanism short of the way we > > constitute recall committees that will give you what you want. > > My issue is not with how the members are appointed to the IAOC. I am > fine with that. My issue is whether they are accountable to the > community or the community's representatives. As written they are > accountable only to the the community's representatives and are thus > one step removed from direct accountability to the community. > > > > > If you think that the community should have the right of complaint, > > then I think you need to accept some limitation by human > judgment on > > how much effort each complaint can cause. > > I have not seen any argument that convinces me that those > limits should > be any different then the limits to judgment that currently exist to > complaints, i.e. appeals, against the IAB or IESG. I am basically > using the 'running code' argument and asking that the appeal > process we > currently have be extended to this new IETF management group. > > > > If that judgment is to lie outside of the IAOC, it has to > be invoked > > for all complaints to the IAOC (making the system more > formalistic); > > if it is inside the IAOC, it seems reasonable to have some means of > > overriding it. > > > >> I, personally see not reason why the IAOC is not directly > addressable > >> by > >> the community and does not have a direct obligation to the IETF > >> community. While I am comfortable with the IESG and IAB being the > >> appeal > >> path for the IAOC, I am not comfortable with them being a > firewall for > >> the IAOC. > > > > I do have a problem with seeing the words that Leslie proposed as > > fitting your description. As described, it isn't a firewall > - it's an > > override of a safeguard. > > A firewall protects. As written the IESG or IAB protects the > IAOC from > the IETF community, which to some extent is being assumed to be a > sometimes malicious DOS'ing environment that the IAOC needs to be > isolated from. > > > > >> I think this is a fundamental question that differentiates > Margaret's > >> formulation from yours. I also think it is a fundamental question > >> that > >> goes back to issues in the problem statement about the current > >> leadership > >> model: too much influence is focused in one leadership group. One > >> benefit of the creation of the IAOC is that it spreads the task of > >> running of the IETF to another group of people. As such, > I think the > >> IAOC must be required to respond directly to the community. > > > > I don't quite see the logic here - we take tasks that are currently > > performed in an undocumented and unaccountable fashion and > move them > > into a body that has oversight over them, is selected by the > > community, is removable by the community, and is (as I see it) > > normally expected to respond to the community. > > To some extent those tasks were performed in an unaccountable > fashion, > and to some extent the Chair's of the IAB and IESG (and maybe the > groups themselves) have been the only ones who had any > visibility, for > some degree of visibility, into them. > > But that is not really the point. If as you say this is > oversight that > never occurred before, then I see this formulation as adding more > responsibilities to the IAB/IESG, i.e. acting as the > oversight body and > as the arbiter of the community's voice. And to refer back to the > Problem process this is adding responsibility to a group that is > already overloaded and which has a scope of responsibility that some > feel is already overly large. > > I guess I dispute, and that really is a fundamental point, that the > IAOC in this formulation is normally expected to respond to the > community. I see them as normally expected to respond to the IAB and > IESG. > > > > > > Question: My reading of Leslie's words is that "It is up to > that body > > to decide to make a response" should be read by the IAOC as "you'd > > better have a good reason not to make a response". > > I don't read it that way. I read it as: "you don't have any need to > respond to anyone who is not in a senior leadership position." And > given that the Chair's of both the IAB and IESG will be on > the IAOC, it > puts them in the position of saying "we can ignore it, I > don't believe > the IAB or IESG will back up this request for a review even > if they get > that far". > > > > > Is what you're really looking for a way to make that "bias" in > > judgment explicit? > > I am not sure I understand this question. But if by '"bias" in > judgment' you mean: am I looking for a formulation that > forces the IAOC > to respond to every request for a review by members of the IETF > community, the answer is yes. And to go further I am looking for the > appeal to start with the IAOC and proceed from there through > the normal > IESG-IAB-ISOC BoT chain of appeal. > > a. > > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf mailing list > Ietf@xxxxxxxx > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf > _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf