Reviewer: Peter Van der Stok Review result: Not Ready This will be a short high-level review, because I am really confused by the contents; and also my knowledge of RPL is ancient. Below the sources of my misunderstanding. The network configuration is not clear. The LBR, DODAG root, usually has at least two interfaces, one wireless LLN interface and a possibly wired, internet link. Only the LLN seems to be discussed, monitoring the LBR via the Internet link looks more efficient to me than the proposal of this document. The fault model of the LLN is unclear, Is it a crash of the LBR CPU or a failure of the wireless interface. The failure of the wireless interface can be electronic, but can also be caused by refelections, etc.. The sentinels, seemingly all the children of the LBR, are supposed to come to an agreement. The subject of agreement between nodes in a failing communication environment is discussed in the "Byzantine Generals algorithm", and its many derivatives. However, no mention is made of this problem and how its known solutions compare to the solution used here. The document claims many improvements in detecting LBR failure over the already existing techniques in the RPL network. However, no numbers are cited as function of the network configuration, for example: a small network with routes of only two hops, or a large network with many hop routes. The document seems to claim that removing of routes and reconstructing routes is no longer needed. I don't understand from the text how that is possible. One thing strikes me as missing, the standardization of the traffic patterns provoked by RNFD. It is recommended that "care is taken". That means ending up with as many traffic patterns as there are manufacturers, possibly leading to implementations that hinder each other instead of collaborating. I would expect a number of sending delays and counters with standardized values. -- last-call mailing list -- last-call@xxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to last-call-leave@xxxxxxxx
