[Last-Call] Re: [secdir] SECDIR Last Call review of draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis-01

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Hi Russ,

Thanks for your instantaneous response. Your proposed changes resolve
my comments.

Thanks,
Donald
===============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 2386 Panoramic Circle, Apopka, FL 32703 USA
 d3e3e3@xxxxxxxxx

On Tue, Aug 13, 2024 at 11:11 AM Russ Housley <housley@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Donald:
>
> Thanks for the review.
>
> > All my comments below are minor to very minor.
> >
> > Section 6, Security Considerations, 1st paragraph. Why is it that
> > compromise of the private keys only "may" lead to the ability to
> > forge? "May" seems right for something like "result in forged
> > signatures" but doesn't compromise of the private key lead pretty
> > certainly to the *ability* to forge a signature?
>
> I changed "may" to "will" in my edit buffer.
>
> > Somehow the presence of "non-volatile" is a bit jarring. I understand
> > that you are talking about exceptional problems but perhaps it would
> > be good to also say the "volatile" storage must not be used?
>
> I do not agree.  NIST has a specification of HSS/LMS that prohibits backup, and some vendors are pushing back against that wording.  Here, I have tried to explain the consequences of various implementation choices without imposing any specific requirements.
>
> > Section 1.3, 3rd paragraph: Would it be reasonable to add just before
> > the comma in the first sentence "but on the difficulty of finding
> > pre-images of a strong hash function" or something like that? While I
> > believe it, is there a reference for the "considered to be
> > post-quantum secure" statement?
>
> How about:
>
>    Since the HSS/LMS signature algorithm does not depend on the
>    difficulty of discrete logarithms or factoring, but on a
>    second-preimage-resistant cryptographic hash function, the HSS/LMS
>    signature algorithm is considered to be post-quantum secure.
>
> Section 1.1 of RFC 8554 contains a CFRG Note on Post-Quantum Cryptography.  Given the vast number of references to this RFC, I think that part is covered.
>
> > Section 2.1, last sentence: While it is somewhat a matter of taste,
> > arguably, except in the most surprising cases, the words "Note that"
> > are mostly superfluous noise. (Ditto for two more "Note that"s in
> > Section 4.)
>
> Agree.  However, it seems awkward to start a sentence with the name of a variable.
>
> I will remove the ones in Section 3.3 and Section 4.
>
> Russ

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