Hi Rob, I’m not sure that I saw a reply to this (and I’m about to put this in for next week’s telechat so wanted to close off this thread), and I’m also sure that Sean or Russ will correct me if my answer
is wrong, but my understanding is that this document is intended to both add support for TLS 1.3 and also update the TLS 1.2 requirements. E.g., from the abstract: RFC 7589 defines how to protect NETCONF messages with TLS 1.2. This document updates RFC 7589 to update support requirements for TLS 1.2 and add TLS 1.3 support requirements, including restrictions on the use of TLS 1.3's early data. In terms of why supporting TLS 1.2 is a MUST, my interpretation (and I’m happy if the SEC experts correct me on this) but I think that this recommendation (and document) is consistent with the recently
published RFC 9325 - Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) (ietf.org), quoting from Section 3.1.1: implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS 1.3 over earlier versions of TLS. The prose in this draft is consistent with RFC 9325, i.e., from section 4:
support the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite [RFC9325]. Implementations MAY implement additional TLS 1.2 cipher suites that provide mutual authentication [RFC5246] and confidentiality as required by NETCONF [RFC6241]. Implementations SHOULD support TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] and, if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS 1.3 over earlier versions of TLS. Regards, From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@xxxxxxxxx>
It's a little bit off though, isn't it? Implementations that support TLS 1.3 should refer to TLS 1.3? Yes. Why does this even need to be written? Also what is the consensus on this paragraph: "Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to support the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite [RFC9325]." I cannot understand why TLS 1.2 is a "MUST" here. How did the WG get there? thanks, Rob On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 3:15 PM Sean Turner <sean@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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