On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 at 13:57, Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> I'll also note that routing protocol nodes are often border routers that have
> privacy properties more similar to a web server than to a web client.
Uh-huh. I could be wrong, but I think that Shivan is merely requesting
that we should mention the issue somewhere. Which I agree with.
I might be missing something, but the introduction of this document says that one of the motivating factors is that VPNs and tunnels can mess up routing and RTT calculation helps with that. Are we not talking about end-users' VPNs?
> A good solution here would be to add a note that clarifies this and
> warns against deploying Babel RTT unencrypted on devices whose network
> location is privacy-sensitive.
I'm not sure if encrypting the Babel control traffic solves the problem.
Even if the data is encrypted, it is still communicated to the other Babel
nodes in the network, who might not or might not be trusted to learn your
location.
Yeah I don't think encryption helps with the privacy problem here.
Claiming that encryption solves the problem would be a little bit like
insisting that all HTTP traffic be encrypted while at the same time
providing a mobile OS that shares your private data with Google.
(Cheap shot, I know.)
-- Juliusz
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