Re: [Last-Call] [v6ops] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops-05

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Hi Tom, Fernando,

I would like to send this document to the IESG.

Have we managed to reach a conclusion on this issue?

Tom, my reading of this draft is as Fernando describes, in that it
only intends to describe the implications and avoids making any
recommendations.

I was going to suggest that a sentence be added to the introduction to
make this clear, but on checking again I see that the document
already contains a pretty clear disclaimer in section 2.
 
2.  Disclaimer

   This document analyzes the operational challenges represented by
   packets that employ IPv6 Extension Headers, and documents some of the
   operational reasons why these packets are often dropped in the public
   Internet.  This document is not a recommendation to drop such
   packets, but rather an analysis of why they are dropped.

Is this sufficient?  

I guess that the authors could consider adding a sentence that it also doesn't provide any recommendation on how end hosts make use of extension headers, but that might be a bit incongruous in the sense that the document doesn't appear to talk about end host behaviour at all ...

Regards,
Rob


> -----Original Message-----
> From: v6ops <v6ops-bounces@xxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of Tom Herbert
> Sent: 10 March 2021 02:03
> To: Fernando Gont <fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Gorry Fairhurst <gorry@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; IPv6 Operations
> <v6ops@xxxxxxxx>; draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops.all@xxxxxxxx;
> last-call@xxxxxxxx; tsv-art@xxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [v6ops] [Last-Call] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-
> v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops-05
> 
> On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 4:03 PM Fernando Gont <fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> >
> > On 9/3/21 19:07, Tom Herbert wrote:
> > [...]
> > >
> > > Yes, ACLs on transport layer ports are common requirements, however
> > > the problem arises from related requirements that arise due to the
> > > limitations of routers to be able to locate the transport layer
> > > information in a packet. An example of such an implied requirement
> > > from this draft is "don't send packets with IPv6 header chains that
> > > are too long because some routers can't parse deep enough into packets
> > > to find the transport layer ports due to implementation constraints
> > > (like limited size parsing buffer)".
> >
> > You seem to be reading more from the document than what we actually said
> > in the document.
> >
> > There are no requirements in this document. We simply explain things
> > operators need to do, what are the associated limitations in real-world
> > devices, and what's the likely outcome.
> >
> > That's not an implied requirement, but simply a description of facts.
> >
> It's obvious that the implied or at least inferred requirement is that
> if a host wants to increase the probability of packets making it to
> the destination then they should not make header chains too long. This
> would also be an obvious interoperability requirement, i.e. if I make
> my header chains too long then packets will be dropped and my host
> stack is not interoperable with some elements in the network.
> 
> >
> >
> > > While the rationale for the
> > > requirement may make sense, the problem, at least from the host stack
> > > perspective of trying to send packets with low probability they'll be
> > > dropped, is that a requirement that "don't IPv6 header chains that are
> > > too long" is is useless without any quantification as exactly to what
> > > "too long" might be.
> >
> > "too long" for the processing device(s). You don't know what devices
> > will process your packets, hence cannot even guess what "too long" might
> > mean.
> >
> > What you know for sure is that the longer the chain, the lower the
> > chances of your packets surviving -- as per RFC7872.
> >
> That seems to me more like an assumption than a proven fact. To prove
> it we'd need the data that correlates the length of the chain with
> probability of drop, or alternatively, one could survey common router
> implementations' capabilities and similarly extrapolate the
> correlation. If we had this data then we could derive a meaningful
> quantified requirement for both what routers are expected to process
> and what hosts can expect. RFC7872 doesn't really have sufficient data
> to make this correlation, and besides that it is not current.
> 
> In any case, this draft qualitatively describes why routers are
> droppings. Which I suppose is good, but, given that information, I
> don't see much that helps host developers that are sending packets in
> the network and are trying to go beyond sending packets that conform
> to the least common denominator of plain TCP/IP.
> 
> Tom
> 
> > Thanks,
> > --
> > Fernando Gont
> > SI6 Networks
> > e-mail: fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492
> >
> >
> >
> >
> 
> _______________________________________________
> v6ops mailing list
> v6ops@xxxxxxxx
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/v6ops

-- 
last-call mailing list
last-call@xxxxxxxx
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call



[Index of Archives]     [IETF Annoucements]     [IETF]     [IP Storage]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux SCTP]     [Linux Newbies]     [Mhonarc]     [Fedora Users]

  Powered by Linux