[Last-Call] Antw: [EXT] Re: [Ntp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-ntp-yang-data-model-10.txt> (A YANG Data Model for NTP) to Proposed Standardsecurity

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>>> Hal Murray <hmurray@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> schrieb am 09.02.2021 um 10:34 in
Nachricht <20210209093446.E11F8406061@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>:

> daedulus@xxxxxxxxxxxxx said:
>> RFC8573 seems clear that MD5 must not be used to effect security for NTP  
> but
>> this I‑D imports iana‑crypt‑hash which allows MD5 without any 
restriction,
>> so is MD5 allowed or not? 
> 
> "Allowed" is the key word.  Just because somebody published an RFC doesn't 
> mean that all the gear out in the field will get updated.  As Harlan pointed

> 
> out, there is a very very long tail on NTP deployments.
> 
> I think it makes sense for iana‑crypt‑hash to include slots for historic 
> items.  If nothing else, it is a good place to say "historic" or 
> "deprecated" 
> and give references to the details.
> 
> If you think a Yang model should discourage using MD5, then I suggest adding

> 
> words to say that.  Better would be to phrase things so that it also 
> includes 
> other algorithms that get kicked out of the club after the RFC is published.

>  
> I don't know of any place that publishes an up‑to‑date list of
crypto‑hashing 
> algorithms and their status.
> 
> ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑
> 
> I'm looking at iana‑crypt‑hash@2014‑08‑06.yang 
> 
> It says:
>          id | hash function | feature
>          ‑‑‑+‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑+‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑
>           1 | MD5           | crypt‑hash‑md5
>           5 | SHA‑256       | crypt‑hash‑sha‑256
>           6 | SHA‑512       | crypt‑hash‑sha‑512

AFAIK DES does no longer work with NTPv4, but it probably would in NTPv3. So
would leaving out DES actually break NTPv3 compatibility? (Not that I suggest
to use DES, but who knows what old NTPv3 gear actually does).
It seems as per RFC 1305 DES is the only algorithm supported ("Cryptographic
Keys (sys.key): This is a set of 64-bit DES keys." on page 64)

> 
> If NTP is the only use, then I'd suggest adding a deprecated note.  But I 
> assume that is used by other than NTP so that may not be appropriate.  But 
> maybe if MD5 is deprecated for NTP it should be deprecated for other uses 
> too. 
>  ???
> 
> What happened to slots 2, 3, and 4?
> 
> Existing NTP code also supports SHA‑1
> 
> RFC 8573 that deprecated using MD5 with NTP suggests using AES‑CMAC.  Note 
> that is CMAC rather than HMAC and that NTP uses it's own scheme rather than

> HMAC as described in RFC 6151.
> 
> The NTPsec code supports any hash (or CMAC) algorithm that the underlying 
> library from OpenSSL supports.
> 
> ‑‑ 
> These are my opinions.  I hate spam.
> 
> 
> 
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