--On Wednesday, June 3, 2020 17:43 -0700 Fred Baker <fredbaker.ietf@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > I can't foresee when a >>> vaccine will become widely available. > > What I am reading suggests that if we don't have an > effective vaccine for SARS or the common cold, we shouldn't > predicate our actions on a vaccine for COVID-19... Fred, I see two differences: (1) While I gather the relative mortality statistics for SARS versus COVID-19 are still in doubt and we know that almost no one suffers lasting damage from the common cold, COVID-19 seems to be nearly unique in being dangerous or severely debilitating to a significant number of those infected _and_ in there being clear evidence of many, quite infectious, asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic carriers. The supposition the people can be contagious for up to a couple of weeks before exhibiting symptoms is, of course, where all the "14 day" stuff comes from [1]. We don't need a vaccine to solve that problem, but the alternative (actually the better one, see [1]) is a test that yields almost zero false negatives, is effective as soon as (or before) someone becomes infectious, was very widely available, and was so easy to administer and had such fast turnaround time that one could administer it to every arriving passenger and not let them out of some airport holding area before the results were in.[2] (2) It is personal guess (and I note my earlier comments about forecasting the future) that "venue closed, no meetings allowed" or other clearcut situations related to the virus on which the IETF can "predicate its actions", are less likely to be our big problem. The bigger problem is going to be countries like Australia or New Zealand who _require_ a 14 day quarantine period when someone enters the country. As a worst-case example, suppose that Thailand imposes a similar rule for November but hotels are open and meetings are welcome. If nothing else changes in between, the implication for Brian, Jay, Mark, Mark, and others would be a requirement to arrive in Thailand two weeks before the meeting, sit around in isolation for those two weeks, attend the meeting, and then fly home and spend another two weeks in isolation. I can't speak for any of them, but I'm guessing that a penalty of five or more weeks away from home, normal work, families, etc., to attend an IETF meeting would cause many people to decide on remote participation. I'd guess that even a two-week penalty (on top of the week of meetings) would keep most people away and would deter many or most companies who sponsor meeting attendance from letting anyone attend. If that situation were to arise and that analysis were correct, then the only thing on which we would be predicating our actions would be the question of whether enough relevant people would show up. If I were a betting man, I'd bet that enough companies who support IESG, IAB, and LLC Board members would want nothing to do with a three- or five-week away scenario to make the outcome rather clear. best, john [1] While it seems to get lost in most of the discussions (and almost all of the government decision-making and guidance) the 14 day business is really about pre-symptomatic carriers, i.e., people who, if exposed and infected, will develop either symptoms or positive results on a test for an active virus during that period. If there are really asymptomatic carriers who can be infectious for a long period with no symptoms at all, all bets are off in the absence of either a highly effective vaccine or a very high reliability test. [2] Of course, suppose a planeload of people arrives at the main airport in Lower Slobbovia. Everyone is immediately tested and routed into a holding area. The test results come back and two people test positive. Now, assuming that the virus has a non-zero incubation period before tests are effective, what do you, as the responsible immigration and public health authorities, do? I think the only scientifically sensible (and sensible from a public heath standpoint) answer is to isolate everyone for long enough for the virus to incubate and reliably start showing up on tests. Maybe, in the presence of a really good test, that would be only three or four days or a week but, relative to the analysis above, that isn't much different from two weeks in terms of its deterrent effect on travel.
