rfc1918 impact

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<snip>

|
| (2) But the typical plug-and-play NAT, at least the ones I have run
| across, is preconfigured with the addresses to be used on the "inside"
| and contains (or is intimately paired with) a DHCP server that gives out
| those addresses.  Installing a DNS filter in the thing that would
| intercept PTR queries for that address range, or any 1918 address range,
| and respond to them in some "canned" way while passing other DNS queries
| out to the network as intended is not rocket science and certainly
| doesn't violate any plug-and-play arguments.

So where is the the leak coming from? If what people claim is true and
if not all, but most NAT-boxes are configured with inside DNS, filtering
and extra cheese, where, I ask you do all of those root-zone requests
and other rfc1918 leaks come from?

	Cheers Leif
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