Re: rfc1918 impact

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--On Wednesday, 15 October, 2003 22:10 +0200 Leif Johansson <leifj@it.su.se> wrote:

| (2) But the typical plug-and-play NAT, at least the ones I
| have run across, is preconfigured with the addresses to be
| used on the "inside" and contains (or is intimately paired
| with) a DHCP server that gives out those addresses.
| Installing a DNS filter in the thing that would intercept PTR
| queries for that address range, or any 1918 address range,
| and respond to them in some "canned" way while passing other
| DNS queries out to the network as intended is not rocket
| science and certainly doesn't violate any plug-and-play
| arguments.

So where is the the leak coming from? If what people claim is
true and
if not all, but most NAT-boxes are configured with inside DNS,
filtering
and extra cheese, where, I ask you do all of those root-zone
requests
and other rfc1918 leaks come from?

Leif,


I was speaking to the architectural issue, not the deployment one. None of the three plug and play boxes I have here with NAT capability has any inside DNS capability (either enabled by default or available to be turned on).

It does sound like a recommendation to the effect of "if you are going to use NAT, or construct a NAT box, then an 'inside DNS' mechanism" would be a reasonable idea. And I would assume it would be an even better one if it made clear what the preferred way was to do an "inside DNS" -- I think there might be a couple of different ways to do it, and some might be less reprehensible than the others.

john



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