Re: Joint legal/technical anti-spam effort

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I have a mailbox at gmx, a german isp in england.  the anti-spam measures
recently enacted there now label all posts from ietf-announce as spam.  be
careful what you wish for.

scott



On Mon, 26 May 2003, Eric A. Hall wrote:

>
> Below is an example of how technology and the law could work together,
> with both camps bringing essential pieces of the puzzle to the table.
>
> What should be most obvious from this exercise is that there needs to be
> somebody willing to intermediate between the legislature and the
> engineers. Otherwise, they will produce ineffective laws and we will
> produce ineffective technologies, both in isolation.
>
> Objectives:
>
>   minimize the need for post-transfer spam detection
>
>     - provide technical measures for refusing mail prior to transfer
>
>     - provide legal backup for when the technical measures are ignored
>
>   fundamental premise is preservation of property rights
>
>     - my bandwidth/storage/cpu is my property
>
>     - this extends into privacy realm; some users may choose to put
>       up virtual "no trespassing" signs and those prohibitions
>       should be protected under the same principles (gradeschool
>       children, emergency-responder mailboxes, hermits, etc)
>
> Technical measures:
>
>   Short-Term
>
>     - RCPT TO response codes signifying acceptance levels, EG:
>
>     - 250 (default) what the law allows by default
>
>     - 255 (stiff) no solicitations at all
>
>     - 259 (extreme) no trespassing -- authorized senders only
>
>     - 25x allows interoperability but other codes may be more useful,
>
>     - especially considering different jurisdictions will likely need
>       their own codes
>
>     - organizations can set default as policy requires, or can allow
>       users to set according to preference
>
>   Medium-Term
>
>     - improve accountability measures in email
>
>     - possibile work areas include encouraging authentication, PTRs,
>       TLS and certificates, etc.
>
>   Long-Term
>
>     - reinvention of mail transfer service
>
>     - eg, recursive signatures of modernized "Received" headers allow
>       path validation at any hop
>
>     - global directory technologies for key retrieval and other uses
>
> Legal Measures:
>
>   Must be defined per-jurisdiction but some US examples might be:
>
>   Definitions
>
>     - define problem messages as any solicitation, such as for money
>       or action (eg "click here")
>
>     - some exceptions such as charities, government, others, MAYBE
>
>     - violations after grace period (1 year?) subject to law
>
>   Protection
>
>     - default case, recent prior relationship is okay
>
>     - recipients may always refuse (eg, stronger response codes)
>
>     - recipients may opt-out even if a current relationship exists
>
>     - no opt-in explicitly required but encouraged by penalties
>
>   Penalties
>
>     - recipient has private civil recourse
>
>     - $500 per unlawful recipient, treble for willful violations
>
>     - can file against beneficiary if invalid recipient
>
>     - can file against bulk-mailer if response codes ignored
>
>     - "loser pays" written into law to prevent abuses
>
>     - state reserves felony penalties for egregious violators
>
>     - bulk-mailers implicitly encouraged to use documented opt-ins
>
> So who would the IETF community trust to take something like (better than)
> this to their jurisdictional legislature(s) and asks for feedback?
>
> <cynic>and have they made the right campaign contributions</cynic>
>
> --
> Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
> Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/
>
>
>

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